CONVERSATIONS OF 1906 139
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung on October 13, 1914, created
considerable surprise, but as soon as the documents were
seriously studied they were seen to constitute no departure
from neutrality on the part of Belgium, and no intention
to violate that neutrality on the side of England or France.
The Treaty of 1839 had imposed upon Belgium the heavy
burden of defending her territory against any State, however
 powerful, which should try to get a passage for troops,
or a base of operations in her territory. Such defence, on
the part of Belgium, could be of no avail without cooperation
 with the Powers which had guaranteed to stand
by her, under the Treaty of 1839. She was therefore not
merely at liberty, but morally obliged to concert a plan
for such combined operations in her own defence. Therefore,
 with regard to the conversations between the Chief
of the Belgian General Staff and the British Military
Attaché, the only question which the Belgian Government
can be called on to answer, is this: when they concerted
a scheme for operations along with Great Britain against
a possible attack by Germany, why did they not make
a complementary agreement with Germany, for concerted
operations against a possible attack by Great Britain or
France ?
Such a method would have been in line with the policy
pursued by Lord Granville, the British Secretary of State
in 1870, when he concluded the treaty to join France, if
the Germans crossed the Belgian frontier, and to join
Prussia against France, if the French invaded Belgium.
That the Belgian Government did not have conversations
‘all round’ in 1906, was because they had reason to believe
that no danger threatened them from France or England,
but that serious danger threatened them from Germany.
The events which took place in the summer of 1914 indicate
that conversations between the Belgian and German
General Staffs would only have supplied Germany with
military information which the Government of that country