[54 THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM

bur field army, and considered it important that no detachments
 from that army should be sent to Namur and Liege,
as those fortresses were provided with adequate garrisons.
He drew my attention to the necessity of letting the
British Army take full advantage of the facilities afforded
under our regulations respecting military requirements.
Finally, he laid stress on the question of the chief command.
I replied that I could say nothing on the latter point,
and I promised that I would study the other questions
with care.
Later, the British military attaché confirmed his previous
estimate : twelve days at least were indispensable to carry
out the landing on the coast of France. It would take
much longer (from one to two and a half months) to land
[00,000 men at Antwerp.
On my objecting that it would be useless to wait till the
disembarkation was finished, before beginning the transport
by rail, and that it would be better to send on the troops
by degrees as they arrived on the coast, Lieutenant-Colonel
Barnardiston promised me precise details of the daily
disembarkation table,
With regard to the question of military requirements,
{ informed my visitor that that question would easily be
arranged.
As the plans of the British General Staff advanced, the
details of the problem were worked out with greater
precision. The colonel assured me that half the British
Army could be landed in eight days, and the remainder
at the end of the twelfth or thirteenth day, except the
mounted infantry, on which we could not count till later.
Nevertheless, I felt bound once more to urge the necessity
of knowing the numbers to be landed daily, so as to work
out the railway arrangements for each day.
The British attaché then spoke to me of various other
questions, viz.: (1) The necessity of maintaining secrecy
about the operations, and of ensuring that the Press should
observe this carefully ; (2) the advantages there would be
in attaching a Belgian officer to each British staff, an
interpreter to each commanding officer, and gendarmes
to each unit to help the British military police.
At another interview Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston
and I examined the question of combined operations in the
event of a German attack directed against Antwerp, and on