REPORT OF CONVERSATIONS 155
the hypothesis of our country being crossed in order to
reach the French Ardennes,
Later on, the colonel signified his concurrence in the
scheme I had laid before him, and assured me of the assent
of General Grierson, Chief of the British General Staff,
Other questions of secondary importance were likewise
disposed of, particularly those respecting intermediary
officers, interpreters, gendarmes, maps, illustrations of
uniforms, English translations of extracts from certain
Belgian regulations, the regulation of customs dues chargeable
 on the British supplies, hospital accommodation
for the wounded of the allied army, &amp;c. Nothing was
settled as to the possible control of the Press by the
Government or the military authorities.
In the course of the last meetings which I had with the
British attaché he communicated to me the daily disembarkation
 table of the troops to be landed at Boulogne,
Calais and Cherbourg. The distance of the latter place,
included owing to certain technical considerations, would
Cause a certain delay. The first corps would be landed on
the tenth day, the second corps on the fifteenth day. Our
railways would carry out the transport operations in such
a way that the arrival of the first corps, either towards
Brussels-Louvain or towards N amur-Dinant, would be
completed on the eleventh day and that of the second corps
on the sixteenth day.
[ finally urged once again, as forcibly as was within
my power, the necessity of accelerating the transport by
sea in order that the British troops might be with us
between the eleventh and the twelfth day; the very best
and most favourable results would accrue from the concerted
and simultaneous action by the allied forces. On the other
hand, a serious check would ensue if such co-operation
could not be achieved. Colonel Barnardiston assured me
that everything would be done with that end in view.
In the course of our conversations I took the opportunity
of convincing the military attaché of our resolve to impede
the enemies’ movements as far as lay within our power,
and not to take refuge in Antwerp from the outset. Lieutenant-Colonel
 Barnardiston, on his side, informed me that
he had at present little confidence in the support or intervention
 of Holland. He likewise confided to me that his
Government intended to move the British base of supplies