264 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR
an ever-increasing jealousy of the growing power of Prussia
supervened.
Bismarck, in his Reminiscences, says, ‘ It was already
quite clear to me that we should have todefend the conquests
of the campaign in future wars, just as Frederick the Great
had to defend the results of his two first Silesian Wars in
the fiercer fire of the Seven Years’ War. That a war with
France would succeed that with Austria lay in the logic of
history *. 1
Prussia proceeded with her task of the unification of
Germany by the formation of the North German Confederation,
 by treaties of alliance with the Southern German
States, and by the placing of all military power in the
hands of the Prussian monarch (see p. 250). It was the
general opinion that a war with France was only a question
of time. In 1867 the question of Luxemburg for a while
threatened the peace of Europe, when France and Prussia
held divergent views about the future of the Grand Duchy,
but the danger of war was averted by means of a Conference
 of the Powers at London, where a treaty was signed
in which the neutrality of Luxemburg was guaranteed.2
In the winter of 1868-9 Count von Moltke elaborated
a complete scheme of action for the contingency of an
invasion of France. Peace was, however, maintained
until the year 1870, when General Prim, the head of the
provisional Government in Spain, suddenly and without
notice to other foreign States (England and France, at
any rate, were not previously informed), offered the then
vacant throne of Spain to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen,
 who accepted it.
The news of this event reached Paris and London on
July 5, 1870. The Duc de Gramont immediately informed
the Prussian ambassador at Paris, in plain language, that
France could not tolerate the establishment of any Prussian

i
3

Bismarck, Reflections and Reminiscences (trans. Butler), chap. xx.
State Papers, vol. vii, P. 32; see above, pp. 257 ff.