316 TURKEY, RUSSIA, AND BALKAN STATES
Black Sea’! No facts were advanced to show that such
breaches of the Treaty of Paris had taken place, nor even
if proved could they have justified Russia in denouncing
the restrictive clauses, as by Article XIV of the Paris
Treaty, Russia had bound herself with the rest of the
Powers to this effect : * It [i. e. the Black Sea Convention]
cannot be either annulled or modified without the assent
of the Powers signing the present Treaty.’
Gorchakov further contended in the circular of October
31, 1870, that the restrictions were unreasonable, and based
upon an unjustifiable distrust of the Russian Government.
The restrictions, he wrote, were unreasonable, because,
* while Russia was disarming in the Black Sea, . . . and
likewise loyally deprived herself of the possibility of taking
measures for an effectual Maritime Defence in the adjoining
 Seas and Ports, Turkey preserved her privilege of maintaining
 unlimited Naval Forces in the Archipelago and the
Straits ; France and England preserved their power of
concentrating their squadrons in the Mediterranean’. In
the same way it was pointed out that the Straits were
only closed by the Treaty of Paris when the Porte was at
peace. In time of war, the Porte could let the navies
of any hostile Power into the unguarded Black Sea, to
the undefended coast of Russia. This danger was all the
greater, as steamships had replaced sailing ships in the
navies of the world since the Treaty of 1856. A swift
attack upon Russia’s unprotected Black Sea coast might
be arranged at any moment.
Stated thus, the neutralization of the Black Sea appeared
to be not altogether fair to Russia, and Gorchakov had
a good case with which to approach the signatory Powers
with proposals for its amendment. Unfortunately he took
no such course, and therefore struck a blow at the respect
for treaties and the public faith of Europe.
For the purposes of Russia, the time was well chosen.
1 Hertslet, vol. iii, No. 429, p. 1804.