RUSSIA AND PRUSSIA 317

France, as before mentioned, was already invaded, and had
lost both fortresses and armies; the Empire had fallen, and
Paris had been invested. Obviously the French Provisional
Government had no: attention to spare for the Eastern
Question. Victorious Germany might have thrown its
weight on the side of justice, and have striven for the
maintenance of the Treaty of Paris or for its modification
by consent of the signatories. But the Prussian Government,
 far from doing this, actually favoured Russia’s
individual denunciation of the Black Sea Convention.
Gorchakov and Bismarck had been friends since 1851,
when Gorchakov was Russian minister to the Diet of the
Germanic Confederation at Frankfort. In 1858 Bismarck
was sent to Petrograd as Prussian ambassador, and remained
there four years. Gorchakov, as Minister of Foreign Affairs,
naturally came into still closer relations with Bismarck.
When Gorchakov became Imperial Chancellor in 1863,
there was quite a rapprochement between the Governments
of Russia and Prussia. The benevolent neutrality and
friendship of Russia was exceedingly useful to Bismarck,
when carrying out his very delicate and risky arrangements
with regard to Schleswig-Holstein in 1863 and 1864. This
largely explains the inactivity of Great Britain during
that crisis. In the same way, Russian friendship gave
Prussia a free hand in the war with Austria in 1866, and
helped to keep Napoleon III inactive. In 1870, when
Prussia invaded France, the Russo-Prussian rapprochement
helped to ensure the neutrality of Austria, which was
confidently expected by Napoleon III to intervene on his
behalf. In return for these very substantial benefits,
Bismarck could do no less than give Russia a free hand
with regard to the Black Sea Convention. Austria was in
no condition to oppose the Russo-Prussian understanding,
Italy was too busy completing her unity by the occupation
of Rome (September 20, 1870). Great Britain's protest
(November 10, 1870) was therefore of little avail, though