APPENDIX A.—MARITIME LAW 49

which it was not fitted, injury resulting. The injured man was denied
full indemnity, however, inasmuch as the fault lay, not in the equipment
 supplied, but in the “improvident order of the master, for which
the owners are not liable.” (John A. Roebling’s Sons Co. ». Erickson
(C. C. A. 1919), 261 Fed. 986.)

Joinder of Claims

A point of interest in this case was a requirement by the trial court
that the seaman elect whether to “stand upon his right to wages and
expenses of maintenance and cure to the end of the voyage,” or to
sue for indemnity. The court of appeals ruled that this was error,
since he was entitled to the former “under any and all circumstances,
except his own willful misconduct. If he recover indemnity, it will
be included; but if he claim indemnity, and fail to get it, he is not
for that reason to be deprived of his right to wages and expenses of
cure and maintenance to the end of the voyage.”
However, since this action was for an indemnity that was denied,
with no other claim before the court. a new trial must be had.

Procedure

Before taking up the statutory changes made by Congress in the
rights of recovery, certain differences between the common law and
admiralty may be referred to as regards the general subject of actions
by an injured employee. Thus, under the maritime law two forms
of procedure are possible, one against an individual, as the master,
captain, or owners of a vessel, known as an action in personam,
and another known as a proceeding in rem, in which the action is
brought against a vessel, its cargo, or other such matter as defendant,
not naming an individual, and accompanied by a provisional seizure
of the article or object against which the action is brought, a form of
attachment as by lien being an essential factor. The Federal Constitution
 provides that the judicial power of the United States shall
extend “to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,’ assuming
 a common understanding of the meaning of such language. The
desirability of a certain measure of flexibility in regard to recovery
of damages for maritime torts was indicated, however, in the provision
 found in the Judicial Code granting to the courts of the United
States jurisdiction over “‘all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction,” by a provision “saving to suitors in all cases the right
of a common-law remedy where the common law is competent to
give it.”” (Judiciary act of 1789, R. S. sec. 563.)
This grant relates to “the right of a common-law remedy,” and this
may be prosecuted in the State courts; however, it does not confer
common-law rights, but only permits the common-law courts to
enforce maritime rights by common-law procedure, and therefore
gives them no power to proceed except against individual defendants,
by actions in personam. (Chelentis ». Luckenbach S. S. Co. (1918),
247 U. 8S. 372, 38 Sup. Ct. 501.) Proceedings in rem can be brought
only in admiralty courts. (The Moses Taylor (1867), 71 U. S.
(4 Wall.) 411, 431: The Glide (1897), 167 U. S. 606. 17 Sup. Ct. 930.)