APPENDIX A.—MARITIME LAW

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This is obviously a modification of the maritime law, since it gives
the ‘‘common-law right” as well as remedy, the measure being the
provisions of the Federal statute of 1908-1910, relating to employees
on railways. Naturally, such a departure from the old rule of nonliability
 (beyond the expense of maintenance and cure) for injuries
due to negligence of the members of the crew, including the officers,
as was involved in this amendment by a substitution of the doctrine
of indemnity or compensatory damages gave rise to objections as to
its constitutionality.
In what appears to be the first case reaching the Supreme Court
involving an application of the liability principle of this act (Panama
R. R. Co. v. Johnson (1924), 264 U. S. 375, 44 Sup. Ct. 391), the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had
maintained the validity of the law (289 Fed. 964) in this case, which
involved an injury suffered at sea by.a seaman while ascending a
ladder from the deck to the bridge. There was allegation of negligence
in regard to the adequacy of the ladder, for which the employer was
held responsible, and also the negligence of the officers of the vessel
in permitting an unsafe arrangement with regard to it, and in ordering
him to go up the ladder. The charge of unseaworthiness was not
stressed, but the action was brought on charges of negligence—a
common-law basis—but modified by statute. It was held by the
Supreme Court that such a modification of the law by act of Congress
was within its power, and that no reason appeared why it might not
bring maritime rules applicable to injuries to employees ‘‘into relative
conformity to the common-law rules or some modification of the
latter, if the change be country-wide and uniform in operation.”
The law was held not to withdraw “injuries to seamen from the reach
and operation of the maritime law, nor to enable the seaman to do
80.” An election between alternatives is granted, making use of the
maritime law as modified, if desired, or pursuing maritime remedy
according to the old rule.
In contrast with the act of 1915, the court held that the amendment
of 1920 disclosed a purpose to modify existing law, if the injured
person so elected, by extending to maritime cases the common-law
right and remedy enjoyed under Federal statutes by railway employees.
 This provision operates only in case of proceedings in personam,
as on the common-law side, when there may be a trial by jury; maritime
 law is not dispensed with, and if the action is in admiralty the
issues would still be tried by the court under the new rules embodied
in the act. “So construed, the statute does not encroach on the
admiralty jurisdiction intended by the Constitution, but permits
that jurisdiction to be invoked and exercised as it has been from the
beginning.”
The contention that the act is discriminatory and arbitrary in
permitting seamen to elect which form of action to employ, while
failing to grant such rights to the employer, was rejected. To permit
a choice between alternatives was held not to be a denial of due process
of law; and “‘in the nature of things, the right to choose can not be
accorded to both parties, and, if accorded to either, should rest with
the one seeking redress rather than the one from whom redress is
sought.”