52 SETTLEMENT FOR ACCIDENTS TO AMERICAN SEAMEN
Limited Liability

As already stated, the amendment of 1920 gives a right of action
in case of death, but it does not affect the shipowner’s right to plead
limited liability as that right existed in admiralty prior to the amendment.
 The principle is expressed by the Supreme Court in The
China (1868), 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 53, as follows:
Originally, the primary liability was upon the vessel, and that of the owner
was not personal, but merely incidental to his ownership, from which he was
discharged either by the loss of the vessel or by abandoning it to his creditors.
Thus, where his administratrix sued under the act of 1920 to
recover for the death of the captain of a tug which sank because
of the explosion of its boiler, the defendant company pleaded limited
liability. The district court denied the plea on the ground of a
repeal of this rule so far as applicable to such a case. (In re East
River Co., 294 Fed. 686.) The case reached the Supreme Court on
this question, where it was held that the owner was entitled to an
injunction restraining further prosecution of the suit. (Same case
(1924), 266 U. S. 355, 45 Sup. Ct. 114.) Assuming the complete loss
of the sunken tug, the basis of recovery was nil, the court saying that
while the act of 1920 ‘‘determines the extent of the seaman’s substantive
 rights and the measure of damages,” the source from which
the damages could be recovered, in those exceptional cases in which
the surrender of the ship is made, is fixed by the earlier law.
What this signifies is more fully set forth in an earlier case (The
City of Norwich (1886), 118 U. S. 468, 16 Sup. Ct. 1150), where it
was held that the value of a surrendered ship and the freight earned,
as a basis of recovery of damages, was the value at the termination
of the voyage; and if she was lost at sea that would be the termination
for the purpose of fixing the owner’s liability, her value as a sunken
vessel being the limit. A subsequent raising and repair, giving an
increased value, would not affect this limit; nor would any msurance
be construed as a part of the owner’s interest or enter into the amount
for which he would be liable.
Other provisions of law limit an owner's liability to the interest
be has in the vessel attached and provide for the pro rata adjustment
of losses where they exceed such value. This limitation operates
where the employment relation is in effect, but where the death of a
seaman was caused by a collision between two vessels, both being at
fault, even though as against his own vessel recovery would be subject
to limitation as above indicated, no restrictions would exist in so far
as the other vessel was concerned. (The Hamilton (1907), 207 U. S.
398, 28 Sup. Ct. 133.)
It may be noted in passing that none of these limitations affects
the right to compensation secured by the longshoremen and harbor
workers’ compensation act of March 4, 1927. (Public Act No. 803.)
This act, by its terms, does not apply to “a master or member of a
crew of any vessel,” but does apply quite generally to other maritime
employments.
* Death Act * of 1920
A second statute that modifies the maritime law was also enacted
im 1920 (Ch. 111, 41 Stat. 537), providing recovery in case of death
“by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas
beyond a marine league from the shore of any State.” This law is