APPENDIX A.—MARITIME LAW, 53

not applicable to the Great Lakes or other inland waters, and, by its
terms, does not in any wise affect any State statute regulating rights
of action or remedies for death. The action provided for is “a suit
for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty.”
The principle of comparative negligence embodied in maritime law is
retained.
This statute, like the Lord Campbell’s or “death acts’ of the
States generally, is not essentially an employee’s act, but is available
for seamen on the same terms as other persons exposed to maritime
hazards, thus curing the defect of nonrecovery for death which admiralty
 shared with the common law until corrected by statute.
The act provides that, if a person die of the injury during the
pendency of a suit for damages, the personal representative may
proceed with the suit. It has been held, however, that where a
seaman was injured on the high seas and carried ashore, dying before
action is begun, no survival of right exists under this act, as the provision
 of law is for a survival of action and not for a survival of a
cause of action, a court of admiralty having no jurisdiction over a
cause arising on land. (Pickles ». F. Leyland &amp; Co. (1925), 10 Fed.
(2d) 371.) Such a construction is out of harmony with the reasoning
 in Van Doren ». Pa. R. (C. C. A. 1899, 93 Fed. 260), where it was
said: “The fact of death is not the tort, but its consequence’’;
while in an action under the Jones Act (1920; ch. 250, sec. 33), it
was said that the fact of a death on land from an injury on board
ship did not affect the right of relief accorded his personal representative.
 (Luckenbach S. S. Co. ». Campbell (C. C. A. 1925), 8
Fed. (2d) 223.) And independently of both statutes, jurisdiction
was maintained in a similar case, the court saying that “it is well
settled by the weight of modern authority that the place of the
injury is the test of the jurisdiction. (Hamburg-Amerikanische
P. A. G.v. Gye (C. C. A. 1913), 207 Fed. 247.) (See also the Greenwald
 case below.)

State Laws

Prior to the enactment of the death statute, recourse could be had
to State laws giving damages if a death occurred on waters under the
jurisdiction of the State, but subject to the terms of such State laws
in respect to limitations, contributory negligence, etc., although differing
 in these regards from the practice in admiralty. (Western Fuel
Co. ». Garcia (1921), 257 U. S. 233, 42 Sup. Ct. 89; The A. W. Thompson
 (1889), 39 Fed. 115; O’Brien ». Luckenbach S. S. Co. (C. C. A.
1923), 293 Fed. 170.) Thus the Supreme Court found it necessary
to reverse a judgment in favor of the administrator of a seaman
killed in San Francisco Harbor, the case being heard under the death
act of California. The district court had held that the limitation of
one year therein prescribed, while binding on State courts, was not
binding in a proceeding in admiralty, a finding that the Supreme
Court rejected. (Garcia case.)
A State statute (or to be exact, one of the District of Columbia)
was held to be applicable to a case of death in 1919, chargeable to
the neglect of the owner of a ship and its agents in respect to the
supply of proper food. Though the cause of death was illness occasioned
 by food supplied on the vessel, and the death took place in
Africa, in a country governed by Great Britain, the liability was
held to be fixed by the law of the flag of the vessel on board which