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INDIA

tainly be massed. Now Bombay would be largely
hampered in assisting in this process by the break of
gauge that occurs in Rajputana, involving delays in the
transfer of men and material, not from one line to
another, but from one set of conveyances to another. It
was this danger—a danger which has been greatly lessened
by the opening of the midland line connecting the G.I.P.
with Delhi and Lahore—which influenced those who
opposed the introduction of the narrow gauge construction.
 Troops from Bombay and Western India
could now be moved to the extreme North-West without
disjointing the internal traffic, and paralysing the commercial
 intercourse of Central India; but the extreme
North-West is not the only part of our frontier which is
Important strategically in the interests of India’s security,
possibly not even the most important part. For the
Baluchistan section of the frontier, for the defence of
Quetta, or for advance on Kandahar, Karachi is the
only port of debarkation, and the North-Western line with
the Quetta extensions the only line of communication.
Great as are modern improvements in the harbour works
at Karachi (into the development of which it is not
necessary to enter), it must be remembered that its
entrance channel is extremely narrow, that it is kept
open with difficulty, and might be easily closed. And
much the same might be said for the double line of
approach to Quetta from the Indus—the line of the
Mushkaf and that of the Harnai. They are both of them
lines subject to periodic interruption from landslips or
from floods, just as surely as are all other mountain
lines whatsoever. Moreover, between Sibi, at the foot
of the Baluch hills, and Sukkur on the Indus, there
is but one single line (liable to periodic flooding from the
Indus overflow) to feed both. On the maintenance of the
Karachi harbour channel and this single line then, the
possibility of rapid concentration of troops and material
appears to depend, and this leads us to the last section
of our study of the railway geography of India—the
question of strategic extensions.