174

APPENDIX II.

(F1.)—Not likely to sacrifice any fiscal independence.


(G.)—If Canada consents to the Chamberlain
scheme, so called, she will have to carry it out in its
entirety. I do not think Canada would be satisfied
to abandon her rights to regulate her own fiscal
policy.
(G 1.)—I do not think Canada is prepared to bind
herself to such an extent as to forego her privilege of
making suitable commercial treaties with other countries.
 Personally, I am of opinion that it would not be
to our interest to so bind ourselves.

8. (x) Do you think it possible to formulate a scheme of
Imperial veciprocity which would not tend to cveate Jriction
within the Empive ? (2) If it be possible, do you think any
such _avvangement could have any degvee of pevmanency ?
(3) If not pevmanent, do you think it would be of any
value, or (4) do you consider peviodical veadjustments to be
commevcially practicable ?
(A.)—On Protectionist lines (1) No ; (2) No; (3) No;
(4) No; it would prove disastrous to the Empire.
Imperial reciprocity, to be safe and sound, must be
brought about by the colonies reducing their tariffs in
favour of the Mother Country and of each other.
This must be brought about by the slow process of
education. Meanwhile, the keystone of the Empire
is absolute self-government in the colonies.
(B.)—If a scheme looking to better trade relations
within the Empire and protection against the outside
nations can be devised, it will involve considerable
friction from time to time within the Empire, and it
may need many re-arrangements. If the general
results are beneficial, such readjustments as are
necessary will be practicable, no matter how difficult.
 It will not be a mere question of difficulties.
It will be a question of whether or not the different
parts of the Empire desire to work together against