176 APPENDIX IIL

Even after an arrangement had been entered into no
Canadian Government would be permanently able to
resist a Canadian demand for raising or lowering a
tariff on one or more articles on the plea that other
Governments had been consulted and were unwilling.
It would smash Governments, and probably constitutions.
 Canadians have no experience of, and no
taste for, denying themselves to please—much less to
advantage—other people.
(D 4.)—The difficulties of making such an arrangement
 would be very great: but not necessarily
insuperable. There could be no absolute assurance
of permanency : like all other commercial treaties it
would have to be liable to termination or denunciation
after the passage of a certain period of time.
(D 5.)—I consider that a hard and fast bargain
would beget friction. A mutual and voluntary preference
 would be far less likely to provoke such a
result. Sentimental considerations will be the strongest
safeguard of a preference, and will make possible
readjustments made in the best interests of the country
granting it.

(F.)—It would lead to friction eventually, because it
would be economically unsound, and sooner or later
people would discover it.
(F 1.)—(a) Yes; (b) Yes; (c) Yes.
(G.)—I cannot answer this question in the absence
of a scheme. It may be possible to formulate such a
scheme, but it would not be permanent. Periodical
adjustments are practicable. We frequently modify our
fiscal policy. The most permanent fiscal policy with
which I am conversant is that of Great Britain, Each
section of the Empire requires a different fiscal policy.
How to reconcile all these and bring them to work
together is, or will be, a difficult problem to solve.
Any system which takes from us our liberty of action
will, I am afraid, be productive of serious friction.
The Boston tax on tea cost us an Empire.