In the first nine months of 1931 expansion of
Soviet exports was definitely checked, and
the total value of exports amounted to 593
million roubles as against 739 million roubles in the
previous year. This fall occurred in spite of the
fact that quantitatively Soviet exports had
slightly increased. Here it may be noted that
protectionist measures applied by Germany and
other countries made it extremely difficult for the
U.S.S.R. to derive compensation for the fall in
prices by increasing the quantities of goods
dumped abroad. While Soviet industrial exports
encountered severe foreign competition and suffered
heavily from the contraction of purchasing power
in Europe and America, the agricultural exports
encountered raised tariff walls, quota regulations,
licences, and even in countries of Free Trade
traditions, growing tendencies towards protection.
Then various developments within Soviet Russia,
as for example the collectivization of agriculture,
which involved the suppression of the well-to-do
peasant, and the wholesale slaughtering of cattle
and drastic periodic reorganisations of the foreign
trade establishments, seriously diminished export
possibilities.
Hence the Soviet Union enters upon the fourth
and last year of the accelerated Five Year Plan,
with a decreased export surplus, equal to, instead
of doubling the whole exports of the first year,
as was originally intended, while at the same time,
it is projected that import requirements should
increase.
Insufficiency in the export of goods was compensated
 to a small extent by the export of gold
and to a larger extent by further borrowings from
abroad, as a result of which the value of imports
remained the same as in the previous year, whilst
owing to the fall in prices their volume greatlv
increased.
During the last year, the Soviet Government
concentrated its attention om the points of the world
money market, most weakened by the crisis, and
which for that reason were less subjected to political
and economic influences unfavourable to the
U.S.S.R. Germany with 5.5 million of her population
 unemployed was anxious to obtain Soviet
orders even when prices were less attractive than
before and pavments were deferred for as long as

nearly two years, and in some instances to five
years (shipbuilding industry). At the same time the
moratorium granted to Germany in the middle of
1931 had the effect of freeing her financial policy
as regards the Soviet Union, from the influence of
English, American and French financial circles,
for thenceforth it was no longer possible for shortterm
 loans invested in Germany by them to be
suddenly recalled. As Germany had not anticipated
 that in the prevailing conditions new foreign
capital would be available for her needs, she considered
 herself at liberty to dispose in her own
way of those foreign monies already invested.
The result was that last year most Soviet orders
went to Germany, and she became paramount
in financing the foreign trade of the U.S.S.R. At
‘he same time the extension by the Labour Government
 in August, 1929, of the Export Credit Scheme
to Soviet Russia, materially improved her credit
position abroad.
We conclude this enquiry by summarising the
position ‘of the U.S.S.R. on international money
markets, both before and since the Revolution.
(1) Prior to 1914, Russia’s commercial debt
abroad consisted of foreign long-term investments
in the form of shares and debentures in trade,
industry, banking and insurance, and of shortterm
 credits advanced by foreign industrial and
commercial firms and banks. According to Professor
 P. V. Ol, on the eve of the Revolution, the
long-term. commercial indebtedness of Russia,
excluding state railway, and municipal debt,
was 2,243 million roubles, while, according to the
estimate of the credit department of the Ministry
of Finance, in the three pre-war years for which
figures are available, short-term indebtedness
amounted to 558 million roubles. Hence the total
commercial debt reached approximately 2,800
million roubles. A comparison between these
figures and those of indebtedness under the Soviet
administration reveals that Soviet Russia's
short-term debts abroad, which we qualify as real
or effective, have reached 31.6%, of the commercial
indebtedness and 158%, of the short-term indebtedness
 of pre-revolutionary times; if contingent
liabilities are also taken, the first figure is increased
to 44% and the second figure to 221%. The
increase of short-term indebtedness partially