SPECIAL REPORTS FOR FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION. 95

Another and very important reason why it is difficult to study the
French combinations of trade resembling the trusts, cartels, etc., of
the United States and Germany is on account of the abnormal conditions
 prevailing since the outbreak of the war.
Legislation for the regulation of combinations.—Legislation for
the regulation of industrial and other combinations in France, such
ns cartels, syndicates, etc., is based principally upon the provisions
of articles 419 and 420 of the French Penal Code, which, in translation,
 read as follows:
ArTICLE 419. All those who by designedly spreading false and calumnious
statements among the public, by overbidding prices asked by the sellers themselves,
 by combinations or coalitions between the principal holders of a particular
 merchandise or food product, with the object of holding the merchandise
or food product for a certain price, or who by fraudulent means shall have
caused the rise or fall of prices of food products or merchandise or of public
stocks or shares above or below the prices which the natural and free course of
commerce would have established, shall be punished by imprisonment of not
less than one month nor more than one year and by a fine of from 500 francs
‘0 10,000 francs ($96.50 to $1,930). The offenders may besides, by decree or
judgment, be placed under police surveillance during a period of not less than
{wo years nor more than five years.
ARTICLE 420. The penalty shall bean imprisonment of not less than two months
nor more than two years and a fine from 1,000 francs to 20,000 francs ($193 to
$3,860) if such manipulations relate to cereals, beans, flour, farinaceous foods,
bread, wine or other beverages. The police surveillance which may be decreed
shall not be less than 5 years nor more than 10 years, :
The law of February 3, 1893, extended the application of the
penalties prescribed in the above article to manipulations which
would tend to injure the credit of the Government.
It would appear from the wording of the above articles that the
formation of industrial combinations in France without an infraction
 of the laws would be impossible. In general, however, the
french courts have refrained from giving unfavorable decisions
against syndicates and other trade combinations formed for the
regulation of prices and production, for combating foreign competition,
 etc., when the combinations have not been found subversive of
the public welfare, but the law can prevent or suppress all combinations
 whose activities would tend to upset market prices, to create
corners or monopolies or to unduly restrain commercial liberty.
Each syndicate, cartel, or combination is judged upon the merits of
its own case, and until it becomes harmful to the interests of the
people is permitted to continue its existence or, in other words, is
tolerated Fioléré). The following are notable decisions which have
been made by the French courts in interpretation of the provisions of
the above-mentioned articles of the Penal Code:
1. The fact that consumers agree not to use a certain product ( gas
in this instance) until the price is lowered does not constitute, when
there is no fraudulent manipulation, either an offense or a quasi
offense.
2. Cornering (accaparement) is not a special and distinct offense,
nor is the accumulation of the same merchandise or commodity in the
hands of a single person or of several persons, even if such concentration
 is the result of a concerted plan, illegal. The offense implies
an illegal rise or fall in the prices; that is to say, fraudulent manipulations
 which influence the market and are the cause of fictitious