96 REPORT ON COOPERATION IN AMERICAN EXPORT TRADE.

prices. In order that cornering, which is a legal act in itself even
If it concerns large quantities, should constitute an offense it is necessary
 that the market prices shall have been influenced by fraudulent
methods.
3. An agreement entered into by several manufacturers to hold in
common a stock of their products, to be sold by each at the same
price, is not necessarily in itself illegal or contrary to public order,
if the object of the contracting parties was not to bring about a fictitious
 rise in the prices of the products by making a corner or monopoly,
 but merely to protect the prices of the products against a
sudden decline or slump owing to local competition and to maintain
them at a.level which would be in harmony with the natural variations
 of supply and demand.
4. There is no coalition between holders of the same merchandise
punishable under the provisions of article 419 when a syndicate of
ublishers, in agreement with the retail booksellers, fixes a price befo
 which the retailer, under penalty of having his account closed,
must not sell books to the public.
5. A mere attempt to commit an offense provided against in article
 419 is not punishable. The means employed, whatever they may
be, to upset the market prices, do not fall, notwithstanding their
fraudulent character, under the application of the penal law unless
they have attained their object.
As to international combinations, article 12 of the law of July 1,
1901, regarding associations provides for the dissolution by decree
of associations composed for the greater part of foreigners and having
 foreign administrators or their principal offices in foreign countries
 which are of a nature to unduly disturb the normal conditions of
the markets of France.

DESCRIPTION OF PRINCIPAL COMBINATIONS.

While in France there are many industrial and commercial organizations
 in the various branches of the industries (formed primarily
 for obtaining useful trade and industrial information, as
statistics, or for securing legislation favorable for their members),
yet there are comparatively few which partake of the nature of a trust
or cartel for the control of the production or for the regulation of
prices, selling zones, and methods of sale of the commodities manufactured
 or handled by its members.
The principal industrial and commercial combinations of the latter
 type are those which have been established in the metallurgical
industries under the name of “ Comptoirs,” or central selling organizations.
 The most important are the Comptoir Métallurgique de
Longwy, Comptoir d’Exportation des Fontes de Meurthe-et-Moselle,
 Comptoir des Poutrelles, Gerpinte des Essieux, and the Comptoir
 d’Exportation des Produits Métallurgiques. There are also
similar organizations in other industries, as, for example, the
Syndicat des Pétroles for handling the petroleum trade of France
or the Comptoir des Salines de I’Est, founded in Nancy about 30
years ago for the regulation of the production and sale of salt. There
are also many more or less formal agreements among the chemical