EXCERPTS FROM HEARINGS. » 301
I do not see how it could help but have an influence, if the large corporations
were permitted to combine for such a purpose.
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{ am assuming that there would be some—there would perhaps be a dozen—
ander the million, and there would be two or three over the million. That
croup of one dozen under the million would be competing with the two or
three above the million, and that would still leave the element of competition in
there, which would take care of the price and prevent the fixing of prices.

That reflex effect, it seems to me, is inevitable. It is simply a question of
weighing the advantages and disadvantages. Now, I think that in the case
of the small corporations the advantages would offset, and more than offset
the disadvédntages; but in the case of the big corporation I believe the reverse.
[ believe the disadvantages fwould more than offset the advantages.

A. H. Weed, attorney at law, representing the Manufacturin
Chemists’ Association of the United States, Boston, Mass., a
bo the bill the association had prepared, on request, setting forth the
ideas as to the character of an amendment necessary to permit cooperation,
 and said further:

To prevent any abuses which might result from such cooperative movements,
any retroactive effect which a combination might have to retain trade in the
United States, the bill has a provision granting power to the Federal Trade
Commission similar to the power which it now possesses to restrain unfair
methods of competition under section 5 of the existing law.

The ability to market a surplus and the effect upon the doméstic
market of the elimination of this surplus was discussed by Hal H.
Smith, counsel for the Michigan Manufacturers’ Association, Detroit,
Mich. He stated:

The presence in the domestic market of a surplus may depress prices, but
removal of that surplus to foreign markets can, of itself, give the public no
reason for complaint, for the public surely has no right to the continuance of
prices brought about by a production so excessive and illogical that it will
jestroy the producer.

George W. Harris, president of the Trustees’ Sinking Fund of the
City of Cincinnati, who favors combinations for the purpose of enpaging
 in foreign trade, said:

it follows that the more goods that can be sold, either of manufactured
product or of the raw product, in foreign countries, the cheaper will finally be
those things to the American consumer, because the larger the production the
less the cost of production.
Francis A. Goodhue, vice president of the First National Bank,
Boston, Mass., said:

It seems to me, with regard to foreign combinations for foreign trade, it is
largely a matter of interpretation or ruling as to exactly how far people can
go, or what they may do, and also trying to draw a line of demarkation—
B strong line—between combinations for foreign trade, so that if they were
allowed, they would not overlap into the field of combinations for domestic
trade. Of course this would be somewhat of a difficult thing. If done properly
and properly supervised, T think it would be very easy.
Charles M. Muchnic, vice president of the American Locomotive
Sales Corporation, New York City, said that the prices fixed for the
export trade in his line would not necessarily be maintained in the
domestic market because—

* * * each inquiry or order for locomotives commands a certain price
which is arrived at after careful estimates of each particular inquiry. No two
orders are alike in price, or comparable, and each inquiry must be treated individually.
 Therefore the manufacturers can have no information or indica-