REPLIES TO CARD AND SCHEDULE INQUIRIES. 435

would not result, and about 79 per cent of the concerns whose business
 amounted to less than $1,000,000 took the same view. On this
showing, the great majority of smaller concerns seem to have little
fear that their trade will be interfered with.
In answering this question, some also had in mind the qualification
given in their reply to the preceding question that such export organizations
 be open to all and not have the right to exclude any concern
 at pleasure. Thus, a student of political economy wrote:
They could and probably would be used to restrain trade in the domestic
market if—
(e¢) Permitted to exclude any concern from membership at pleasure.
(b) Organized and controlled upon a capitalistic basis instead of as purely
cooperative associations. Cooperative control, as distinguished from capitalistic,
means that each member of the organization has an equal voice in it, irrespective
of its wealth or capital or the amount of its contribution to the marketing organization,
 and is given a full opportunity to register its voice upon all matters
 affecting the conduct of the association.

A. Berier THAT Export CooPERATION WoULD RESULT IN RESTRAINT
oF DoMmestiC TRADE.

In stating a belief that cooperative organizations for export business
 would result in restraint of domestic trade, many respondents
evidently did not think of such organizations as subject to Federal
regulation. The principal reasons advanced by those who foresaw
danger of restraint of domestic trade are illustrated by excerpts
from typical replies received.
Various manufacturers believe that foreign business and domestic
business are so closely associated and interrelated that it would be
impossible to consider one without the other. Thus, a very large
manufacturer of watch movements said:
We doubt whether you can differentiate between foreign and domestic business
 when it comes to the question of cooperation.
Some think that combinations, in themselves, are dangerous. Others
say that restraint of trade in the domestic market would result as a
natural outgrowth of the intimate relations which would exist among
the manufacturers who are members of these export organizations.
Thus, an economist wrote:
Firms accustomed to work together in foreign trade would be disposed to
nnderstand each other at home.

Many suggested that, with the right to fix prices for export, these
organizations would be able, very easily to make and conceal price
agreements as to domestic trade. Thus a professor of economics
said *

Such export organizations might be used to restrain trade in the domestic
market if no means were taken to prevent such a result, since it would be very
easy to cover up an agreement to fix domestic prices on the ground that the
aoreement covered foreign prices only.

A number of respondents point out that, with a foreign market to
absorb the surplus, these organizations might cause an artificial shortage
 in the domestic market and raise or lower prices to suit. Thus,
a manufacturer of motor-vehicle horns wrote:

We believe that such an export organization could be used to restrain trade
in the domestic market by diverting a certain per cent of the products to the
foreign markets, thereby shortening the domestic supply.