436 REPORT ON COOPERATION IN AMERICAN EXPORT TRADE.
Many who apparently contemplated no governmental control of
export combinations believe that by cutting prices and other unfair
competition these organizations would be able to crush and drive
out of business small competitors. Thus, a manufacturer of cooking
and heating stoves wrote at length:
Such powerful combinations, say, of manufacturers of analogous but nonconflicting
 lines, finding other types of goods commanding a large sale abroad,
une or more among them, could go into the manufacture of close imitations, and
with the general selling expense already covered by the profits on their own
zoods, undersell the smaller makers and drive them from the export trade.
This would have the effect of restraining their trade in the domestic market,
both by the increase of overhead expenses, due to reduction of output, and by
adding another competitor at home qualified to undersell them.
Similar combinations would be susceptible of the development of injury to
one concern in the combination if, at the expiration of a limited selling agreement,
 the others formed a separate combination, leaving him out, and made
his export trade an object of attack with goods they made especially to compete
 against him.

B. BeLier THAT Export CoopEraTION WOULD NoT RESULT IN ReE-STRAINT
 OF DOMESTIC TRADE.

As shown already, about 75 per cent of those who replied to this
question directly expressed the belief that cooperation for export
trade would not have a tendency to restrain trade in the domestic
market.
The relatively few who were speaking of organizations of manufacturers
 dealing only in noncompeting products believed generally
that this restriction, in itself, would prevent the possibility of restraint
 of trade. Thus, a manufacturer of uniforms and clothing,
with important sales, states that he does not see how an export organization
 composed of noncompeting concerns “ could restrain trade in
the domestic market.” Again, a manufacturer of corsets, whose
product is an important factor in the domestic market and is largely
sold abroad. states:

If we, as a corset maker, should combine with a shoemaker, or a hat maker,
or a shirt-waist maker, for export development, we can see no possible connection
 between such a combination and any restraint of trade in this country.
Another respondent, a small manufacturer, said:
As we have stated before, we think that each organization should consist
of members manufacturing noncompeting lines as far as price and quality are
roncerned.
If this is the case, competition would be unimpaired in the local markets
as the firms not in the export organization would enter into a still keener competition
 with the members of the organization in the trade in the local markets.
If noncompeting firms are members of this organization, we can not conceive
that it shuld be necessary or required to prevent them from restraining domestic
rade.

On the other hand, some of the many who believed that membership
 in export organizations should be open to all, i. e., competitors,
 maintained that this fact, in itself, would prevent any restraint.
 Thus, a manufacturer of doors wrote:

If all manufacturers in particular industries could be members of the respective
 combinations, the interests would be too widespread and divergent to permit
 of restraints. The freedom to combine would naturally demand the freedom
to expand at will.