REPLIES TO CARD AND SCHEDULE INQUIRIES. 441

in the domestic market also, it is declared by some that such mutual
understandings would be ‘beneficial to the public and would not
restrain trade.
A manufacturer of metal specialties wrote:
We can not see how such organizations would tend to restrain domestie
trade, since the organization would be specifically for foreign trade. On the
other hand. it is possible that such organizations for foreign trade might mean
a better acquaintance of the members and a better knowledge of their products,
which might tend to lead to competition between them on a more friendly basis,
as opposed to destructive competition.
Again, a producer of flour said:

The association of a number of manufacturers whose purpose initially was to
regulate prices, terms, etc., to the export trade would lead to a better understanding
 between them, and, no doubt, they would discuss matters of common
Interest in the domestic markets—prices, terms, ete. This would not be harm-Ful
 to the consumer, but would result in his benefit. The discussion of prices,
terms, etc., between manufacturers would lead to a uniform price on a reasonable
 basis to the consumer and would eliminate the ruthless, wasteful competilion
 which is now apparent.
An officer of a chemists’ association stated :
It can not be denied that if manufacturers A, B, C, etc, are permitted to
cooperate for the export trade, it necessarily follows that A, B, and C must
pach disclose to the other a certain amount of trade information which may
tend to bring about mutual understandings. It does not follow that abuses will
result nor lawful domestic trade be restrained.
A manufacturer of excavating machinery wrote:

In most lines, it is probable, however, that a combination for export trade
would have some reflected influence on competition in domestic trade. For example,
 in domestic trade, the condition is, sometimes, found that a contract for
£1,500 worth of machinery will be sought for by 10 visiting salesmen from 10
competing concerns, representing an aggregate outlay for services and expenses
of salesmen at least equal to the whole amount of the contract. This is an
incidental evil of some lines of business as now conducted, and it has the
eventual tendency—if combination or cooperation are forbidden—to drive capital
 out of such lines of industry and, similarly, to drive out the employment of
lahor therein. The fact that such capital may find employment elsewhere and
that such labor may find employment elsewhere, does not alter the fact that,
incident thereto, there is a waste of capital and of labor and its capital. In the
event of foreign combinations being permitted, it is not unlikely that such
situations as described would be modified to the advantage of both the buyer
and the seller.
Another reply was:

In fact, rather than restrain trade in the home market—in the sense that
“ pestraint of trade” is understood at present—it would seem that the amount
of information that the different producers would gain about one another’s/af-Pairs,
 through association in the export combination, would lead to keener,
more intellicent. and cleaner competition at home.

In contrast to those who state that the effect of export combinations
 would be to crush the small competitors and drive them out of
business, one of the respondents believes it would be beneficial to
them :

We do not believe that export organization would be used to restrain trade
in the domestic market. We believe such organizations might be the means of
sliminating some of the unfair competitive conditions that now prevail in the
domestic market, in other words, it would help to bring about a spirit of cooperation
 which tends to maintain and develop the smaller and weaker competitors.
