Agricultural relief: Export debenture plan

Export debenture plan (Pt. 5)

Bibliographic data

Multivolume work

Identifikator:: 1831932415

Document type:: Multivolume work

Title:: Agricultural relief

Place of publication:: Washington

Publisher:: Gov. Pr. Off.

Year of publication:: 1928

Collection:: Economics Books

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Volume

Identifikator:: 1831934671

URN:: urn:nbn:de:zbw-retromon-232129

Document type:: Volume

Title:: Export debenture plan

Volume count:: Pt. 5

Place of publication:: Washington

Publisher:: Gov. Pr. Off.

Year of publication:: 1928

Scope:: III S., S. 299 - 427

Digitisation:: 2022

Collection:: Economics Books

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Chapter

Document type:: Multivolume work

Structure type:: Chapter

Title:: Statement of Albert S. Goss, Master Washington State grange and member Executive Committee, national grange, Seattle, Wash.

Collection:: Economics Books

AGRICULTURAL RELIEF 361 ago. Mr. George F. Stone, who was secretary of the Board of Trade of Chicago. was asked bv David Lubin: Mr. Stone, I desire to ask you a few questions in your official capacity as secretary of the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago. What effect would a Government bounty on the exports of wheat have with respect of the general price of what throughout the United States? Answer. I would in my opinion increase the price per bushel. Question. It is said that the speculators would get the 5 cents bounty, or at east the greater part of the bounty. Answer. If a bounty of 5 cents a bushel should be given by the Government on all wheat exported from this country, in my opinion the farmer or pio- ducer would receive the full benefit of that bounty and not the speculator or exporter. It would simply enable the buyer to pay that much more thau he otherwise could pay or would be justified in paying. Competition would force him to pav all he could to the farmer to obiain his wheat. It would be for the interest of the exporter to obtain the wheat; that would be his object. Competition would force him to secure it by every possible means without loss to himself. His great object is to maintain his business, to enlarge his busi- ness. Competition would impel him as it now impels him to give every cent that he can possibly afford to secure the product which he seeks io export, The fierceness and intensity and volume of competition, by the very force of circumstances, by the very necessities of the case would drive the 3 cents bounty proposed by the Governmen® into the pockets of the farmer or pro- ducer. There it would land and from there it could never be wrested by speculators or by anybody else. Question. It is also admitted by some that the 5 cents would come in some way to the producer for the quantity that would be exported, but that there would be no advance on the greater quantity remaining for home use. Answer. It is a mistake, in my opinion, to say that the 5 cents per bushel vounty which it is proposed to give would be confined in its beneficial results ‘0 the quantity or volume of grain exported. It would affect the price of the entire crop. for the reason that grain is a surplus crop in this country. and consequently the price per bushel of this grain is fixed and controlled by the export price of this grain. and this export price, of course, I will here aay parenthetically. is made in competi.ion with all the other surplus wheat-pro- ducing countries in the world. No domestic buyer will pay one single fraction of a cent more for a single bushel of wheat than the buyer for export will pay. The latter makes the price for the entire crop. If no more were raised than was required for home consump. ion the price would depend upon the domestic demand ; but the export demand is a continuous demand, inasmuch as the demand for food can never be interrupted for any length of time, and this continuous demand for wheat, so far as a surplus wheat-producing country is concerned, fixes the price of the en.ire crop of this cereal of that country. No class of domestic buyers, of course, can be made to pay any more than the price offered by the export demand, the domestic and the export demand being rer nresent in the market. [ do not say that ihe statement quoted is final authority. but it is 1 clear statement. Mr. Mrxces. May I ask vou a question right there? Mr. Stewart. Yes, sir. Mr. Menges. If the competition would be so intense as you seem to indicate, why is it that the competition in buying wheat now ‘etween these exporters does not make a difference in price? Mr. Stewart. It does not make a difference in price ? Mr. Mexces. Does not make any difference in the price. Mr. Stewart. As compared with what, Mr. Menges? Mr. Mexces. Well, I mean you have never heard that one exporter fers <0 much for wheat and another one so much, have you? Mr. Stewart. In answer to that question, may I call vour atten- lion to a report by the Federal Trade Commission on grain ex- porters? There an examination was made of two alleged price igreements. One was the so-called Gulf price agreement. the other

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