Responsible government in the Dominions: Responsible government in the Dominions

Responsible government in the Dominions (Vol. 2)

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Multivolume work

Identifikator:: 1896933912

Document type:: Multivolume work

Author:: Keith, Arthur Berriedale http://d-nb.info/gnd/119086794

Title:: Responsible government in the Dominions

Place of publication:: Oxford

Publisher:: Clarendon Press

Year of publication:: 1912-

Collection:: Economics Books

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Volume

Identifikator:: 1896935052

URN:: urn:nbn:de:zbw-retromon-238139

Document type:: Volume

Author:: Keith, Arthur Berriedale http://d-nb.info/gnd/119086794

Title:: Responsible government in the Dominions

Volume count:: Vol. 2

Place of publication:: Oxford

Publisher:: Clarendon Pr.

Year of publication:: 1912

Scope:: XI Seiten, Seiten 570-1100

Digitisation:: 2022

Collection:: Economics Books

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Chapter

Document type:: Multivolume work

Structure type:: Chapter

Title:: Part IV. The federations and the union // Chapter II. The commonwealth of Australia

Collection:: Economics Books

926 THE FEDERATIONS AND THE UNION [PART TV modelled, the Constitution of the United States. The pro- vision for merely absolute majorities, which is borrowed from some of the state Constitutions, is a sensible one, and avoids the difficulties in finding two-thirds majorities. Then the provision for deadlocks is very interesting. It differs from the provision in the case of ordinary legislation in 8. 57 by allowing either House to institute a reform measure, and the direct reference to the people is given at an earlier stage than the reference by a dissolution in the case of ordinary deadlocks. This arrangement is fundamentally sound, for the Constitution is essentially a matter for the people to decide upon, and therefore there is no ground for allowing the Constitution to be kept back from their arbitra- tion. Again, the interests of the states are consulted by the requirement for a majority in both states alike and in electors alike, and this requirement permits any three states to block any proposal of constitutional change. The pro- vision as to the counting of only half the voters in any state where female suffrage existed was due to the fact that in 1900 female suffrage was not universal, and has become of no importance, since the Federal Franchise Act of 1902 made the female suffrage uniform throughout the Commonwealth. The states are again safeguarded by the special provision at the end of the section under which any alteration diminish- ing the proportionate representation of any state in either House of Parliament or the minimum number of represen- tatives of a state in the House of Representatives, or in- creasing, diminishing, or otherwise altering the limits of the state, or in any matter affecting the provision of the Consti- bution in relation thereto shall become law unless the majority of the electors voting in that state approve the proposed law. The proviso is well worded to secure that the section itself shall not be altered without the consent of the majority of the electors of the state. This is due, of course, to the fact that in the case of New South Wales the provisions of the Constitution of 1855, which required two-thirds majorities for certain amendments of the Constitution, were swept away by

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