Responsible government in the Dominions: Responsible government in the Dominions

Responsible government in the Dominions (Vol. 3)

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Multivolume work

Identifikator:: 1896933912

Document type:: Multivolume work

Author:: Keith, Arthur Berriedale http://d-nb.info/gnd/119086794

Title:: Responsible government in the Dominions

Place of publication:: Oxford

Publisher:: Clarendon Press

Year of publication:: 1912-

Collection:: Economics Books

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Volume

Identifikator:: 1896935311

URN:: urn:nbn:de:zbw-retromon-237672

Document type:: Volume

Author:: Keith, Arthur Berriedale http://d-nb.info/gnd/119086794

Title:: Responsible government in the Dominions

Volume count:: Vol. 3

Place of publication:: Oxford

Publisher:: Clarendon Pr.

Year of publication:: 1912

Scope:: XII Seiten, Seiten 1102-1670

Digitisation:: 2022

Collection:: Economics Books

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Chapter

Document type:: Multivolume work

Structure type:: Chapter

Title:: Part V. Imperial control over Dominion administration and legislation

Collection:: Economics Books

CHAP. V] TREATY RELATIONS 1125 wealth Constitution Bills of 1891 and 1897 included treaties with external affairs in the powers of the Commonwealth Parliament, but the words were omitted in the final Act? In the correspondence arising out of the Vondel case. Mr. Deakin, as Attorney-General of the Commonwealth, argued that the omission of the words made no difference to the legal position, but whether that is correct it is impossible to say. In any case, it is clear that no treaty can be adhered to except with the assent and at the request of the Common- wealth Government. Nor does it seem doubtful that in matters within the legislative competence, whether exclusive or paramount, of the Commonwealth Parliament, it would be legitimate to adhere to any treaty at the request of the Commonwealth Parliament alone. On the other hand, it is impossible to be certain what is the position in cases in which the Commonwealth has no direct legislative power. In those cases, while the assent of the Commonwealth to any adherence is obviously constitutionally necessary, could the Commonwealth adhere without the assent of any particular state,” and if so would it have legislative power under s. 51 (xxix) to make good its adherence ? It appears that where the Commonwealth has not exclusive or paramount power, 1t might adhere for some states who so desire, and not for others, but where the Commonwealth has power, presumably it would adhere as a whole or not at all. But it is possible that in any case the Commonwealth would not be willing to adhere partially, as this might be held to result in a dis- crimination between the states, which is contrary both to the spirit and the letter of the Commonwealth Constitution. * Quick and Garran, Constitution of Commonwealth, pp. 622 seq., restrict its effect—probably rightly——to the power to deal with the appointment of external agents (e. g. the High Commissioner Act of 1909), the conduct of Commonwealth business alone, and such matters as extradition (though the latter power has been questioned as regards fugitive offenders ; see McKelvey v. Meagher, 4 C. L. R. 265), e.g. the Extradition Act, 1903. No Fugitive Offenders Act has yet been passed. The views of Lefroy (Law Quarterly Review, 1899, p. 291), Jethro Brown (ibid., 1900, p. 26), and Harrison Moore (ibid., p. 39) are clearly wrong. Cf. above, p. 802. * Cf. Harrison Moore, Commonwealth of Australia,” pp. 461, 462,

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