Die Heimarbeit im Kriege

Unemployment in the United States

Bibliographic data

Monograph

Identifikator:: 885356659

URN:: urn:nbn:de:zbw-retromon-5912

Document type:: Monograph

Author:: Gaebel, Käthe http://d-nb.info/gnd/1023047020; Schulz, Max von http://d-nb.info/gnd/1033198951

Title:: Die Heimarbeit im Kriege

Place of publication:: Berlin

Publisher:: Verlag von Franz Vahlen

Year of publication:: 1917

Scope:: 1 Online-Ressource (210 Seiten)

Digitisation:: 2017

Collection:: Economics Books

Usage license:: Get license information via the feedback formular.

Chapter

Document type:: Monograph

Structure type:: Chapter

Title:: X. Ausblick

Collection:: Economics Books

UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 87 1a y= to Sy- se, the ter ate an the cal ce- ies es 230 It wes 5) res at de ch er- er- xd. Jie at ivy ve 1d mn 139 ul, Te Ab, lie al V «9 of IS nm le re it, n- 3 rh ur 1 (Cs tion every point that has been raised with reference to the constitu- tionality of the legislation, and covers it conclusively. I should also like to file after that just a brief ehronology of the growth of the legislation on this subject. The CratrmMAN. It may be received. (The document referred to follows:) FEDERAL AID BILL—THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EMPLOYMENT OFFICE BILL, 5. 3060 By Joseph P. Chamberlain, of Columbia University There are several Federal statutes which make or authorize appropriations offering Federal aid to the States in conducting certain charitable, social, and educational enterprises. The acts referred to are the Smith-Lever act (38 Stat. 372), agricultural extension work in State colleges; the Smith-Hughes act (3, Stat. 929), for training teachers of vocational and agricultural subjeets and paying teachers’ salaries; the Smith-Sears act (41 Stat. 735), industrial vocational rehabilitation; the Federal highway act (42 Stat. 212), and the Sheppard-Towner act (42 Stat. 324), maternity and infancy welfare. Doubt of the constitutionality of the Sheppard-Towner act was expressed in an opinion by the attorney general of Massachusetts, 1822. (7 Mass. Law Quarterly, May, 1922, 67.) As a result, two cases were brought to the supreme court to enjoin its enforcement. (Mass. ». Mellon; Frothingham ». Mellon, 262 U. 8. 467, 67 L. ed. 1078 (1922).) The first was brought by the State, claiming the act invaded the right of the State to loeal self-govenment and was a usurpation of power by Congress and that it imposed on the State an unconstitutional option either to yield its reserved rights or to lose its share of the appropriation. Con- sidering the suit as being brought by the State in its own behalf, the court said, “We are called upon to adjudicate, not rights of person or property, not rights of dominion over physical domain, nor quasi-sovereign rights actually invaded or threatened, but abstract questions of political power, of sovereignty of gov- ernment. No rights of the State falling within the scope of judicial power have been brought within the actual or threatened operation of the statute. If an alleged attempt by congressional action to annul and abolish an existing State government ‘with all its constitutional powers and privileges’ presents no justicia- ble issue, as was ruled in Georgia v. Stanton (6 Wall. 50, 75, 18 L. ed. 721, 724), no reason can be suggested why it should be otherwise where the attempt goes no farther, as it is here alleged, than to propose to share with the State the field of State power.” The court pointed out that no State rights were invaded merely by extending the option, and held that the question of usurpation of power, when nothing had been done and nothing was to be done without the State's consent, was not a judicial question, of which the court would take cognizance, but a political question over which the court had no jurisdiction. In short, the court decided that the act involved no State rights protected by the Constitution and that there was nothing contained in it t6 lead the court to find it unconstitutional as a usurpation of power. It also held that a State can not as parens patriae institute judicial proceedings bo protect its citizens who are also citizens of the United States from the operation of a statute of the United States, since, with respect to their relation to the Federal Government, it and not the State represents them as parens patriae. The other case decided at the same time, Frothingham ». Mellon, was brought Dy a taxpayer of the United States to enjoin enforcement of the act on the ground that the appropriation from the general funds increased the burden of future taxation and thereby took the plaintifi’s property without due process of law. But the court decided that though a taxpayer might sue to enjoin the illegal use of the money of a municipal corporation, his interest in the money in the National Treasury is so minute, and the effect of payment of the funds on future taxation is 50 remote and uncertain, that no action can be maintained to prevent enforce- ment of the appropriation. These statutes and the bill, drawn on their pattern, seem therefore to be free from possibility of attack in an action by a State or by an individual taxpayer. As to the objection made to the Federal aid acts that they are infringements hy Congress on the State rights of local self-government through the conditions imposed precedent to enjoying the benefits of the acts and that acceptances by the State would be void as an abdication of the State's sovereignty, Burdick (8

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