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lems of a special and limited science instead of problems
requiring a co-ordination of the knowledge available from
all social sciences.
Within the fields of theoretic inquiry there is no sharp
distinction between the philosophic and the scientific method.
 Philosophy is still rampant in the so-called social sciences.
 Economics has been dominated for a century by
speculations about values and by mental gymnastics with
the concepts of land, labor, and capital which are comparable
 only to the scholastic antics with the true, the good, and
the beautiful. Political science is still trying to emerge
from its wrappings, is still trying to free itself from the
metaphysical doctrines which have carefully protected it
from crude contacts with the harsh world of actuality.
Jurisprudence is only beginning to discover that there is
something more to law than a logically coherent system of
legal “ought” concepts.
The light is dawning, and the social sciences are beginning
 to make some progress toward a scientific methodology,
 but the goal is yet far off. Psychological obstacles prevent
 a speedy journey.
There is still in every social scientist an irresistible urge
to become a social philosopher and to interpret the whole
of social life in terms of his own specific interest as its ultimate
 category. This tendency to interpret society in terms
of a single category is induced by the laudable motive to
see life whole. But it leads to trouble if the philosophic results
 are taken for science. Every time a new science comes
into being or an existing inquiry makes rapid progress,
there follows an effort to interpret society in terms of the
fundamental category of that special inquiry. After the
first development of jurisprudence, society was discovered
to be a contract. After the growth of the new metaphysics,
society was discovered to be an idea. After the develop-