3
THE SOCIAL THEORY OF GEORG SIMMEL
tion, not of a variable and a constant, but of two variables.
The organizing thought forms themselves have become
variables subject to change and development.
Not only his epistemology, however, but also his theory
of values and his metaphysics of life are relativistic in
essence, and this relativism has given his fine analytic and
dialectic mind the widest possible scope.
Simmel’s relativism has become a dialectic, something
dynamic and functional. It is not primarily a formal struc-
ture, a doctrine; it has become a mode of thinking, a
thought form, a method of approach. He is a relativist,
not only in the more restricted sense of the term, but in
the widest possible sense. He views unity as a reciprocity
of parts, he resolves the fixed, the permanent, the sub-
stantial into function, force, and movement, and recog-
nizes in all existence the historical process of growth.
With his emphasis on process and function rather than on
product and content, he approaches Nietzsche and Bergson
in their conception of life itself as the ultimate value.
With his emphasis on the significance of the external world
for the judgment and valuation of scientific knowledge, he
approaches modern pragmatism.
A full explanation of his relativistic philosophy would
take more space than can here be devoted to that purpose.
Therefore a short summary of its particular application to
the problem of knowledge and a brief indication of the
metaphysics of his pluralistic universe must suffice as an
illustration of his thought and as a background and basis
for comparison with his treatment of societv.!
1 For the complete development of Simmmel’s theory of knowledge, the reader
s referred to the following works and essays: Einleitung in die Moralwissen-
schaft, Vol. I; Philosophie des Geldes, Intr. and pp. 62-86; Philosophische Kultur,
[ntr.; Kant; “Uber eine Bezichung der Selectionslehre zur Erkenntnisstheorie,”
Archiv fiir Syst. Phil., 1 (1895), 34-385; “Sur quelques relations de la pensée
théorique avee les intéréts pratiques.” Revue de Mét. et de Mor., IV (1896), 160-78.
