4d 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 11 
This idea of the relativity of truth should not be under- 
stood as an approximation to an otherwise independent 
concept of absolute truth, but as the essence of truth it- 
self, as the way in which ideas become true. It does not 
mean a knowledge of the truth from which more might 
have been expected, but rather, on the contrary, the posi- 
tive fulfilment and validity of its concept. The truth is not 
valid in spite of its relativity, but because of its relativity.’ 
Not only does empirical knowledge result from specific 
normative functions on the data of experience, but each 
field of mental activity constructs a picture of the world 
according to categories of its own. Art, religion, meta- 
physics, and science result from specific attitudes toward 
the world, from specific ways of dealing with things. The 
specific functional, formal activity of the mind is for Sim- 
mel the essence and significance of these fields. Their true 
value lies, not in their content, not in the religious dogma 
or in the metaphysical system, but in their function for 
life. They have value as functions of life. 
In the case of metaphysics, this differentiation between 
the function and the content enables Simmel to give to the 
metaphysical tendency, or to the process or mental atti- 
tude which results from it, a value and significance which 
remain untouched by all the contradictions and untenable 
points in its content. Philosophy as a thought form is un- 
prejudiced against all contents and obtains a flexibility 
and a possibility of extension which is unthinkable as long 
as one searches for the essence of philosophy in the factual 
content of its problems. 
This differentiation therefore means more than a mere 
differentiation; it means also an accentuation. It means 
emphasizing the functional over the substantial aspect. 
It means a change in conception from metaphysics as dog- 
- Phil. des Geldes, pp. 78-82.