GENERAL INTRODUCTION 13 
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an object, but correspondence with the totality of its 
world-conception, is the aim of the philosophic truth. 
The essence of philosophic thought is its self-sufficiency. 
It is unrelated to anything external and is directed above 
the momentary singularity to the totality of knowledge 
and to the totality of life. 
Not only is there no immediate relation between the 
metaphysical statement and the external world, but even 
within the sphere of metaphysics that which holds good in 
the height of its abstractions cannot be applied to the 
single elements of existence. The specific concept of a 
philosophic truth is peculiarly detached from the factual 
content of its propositions. This is due to the fact that its 
picture of the world results from the unification of the 
totality of existence on the basis of a one-sided selection of 
slements. The paradox of all great philosophic world- 
conceptions lies in the fact that they pronounce absolute, 
general statements which do not even fit the single cases 
that are logically included. The reason for this is that the 
general character of these statements is not a formulation 
of the universal aspect of particulars, but of the universal 
aspect of the mental reaction toward them.! 
Metaphysics constructs a picture of the world accord- 
ing to categories which have little or nothing to do with the 
categories of empirical knowledge. When for metaphysics 
existence is the appearance of the absolute spirit or the 
absolute will, moral action the expression of our noume- 
non, when matter and spirit are two sides of one substance, 
then all this lies in a plane which bears the criteria of its 
significance and validity within itself. Within this thought 
mirror the world forms a self-sufficient picture which 
satisfies only metaphysical requirements, not requirements 
springing from different needs. One may reject philosophic 
| Hptprobl. der Phil., pp. 2742.