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MISUNDERSTANDING IN REGARD TO CREDIT 451
of 1772, the inevitable reaction came. The Bank was able A.D. 1689
to support commercial credit satisfactorily for a time; but >
the unexpected failure of the Heales!, a large London house,
through defalcations amounting to £300,000, by one of the
partners named Fordyce, involved so many other firms in
disaster that a general collapse ensued, which seemed almost
as serious as the bursting of the South Sea Bubble. As
Fordyce had also carried on banking in Scotland, the effects
of his conduct extended to that country, and brought about
the fall of various trading houses. Among these was the brought
newly-founded Ayr Bank, which had been much less success- failure of
fully managed than its older rivals. A run began on it just %e dor
a week after Fordyce had disappeared; after eight days it 177%
had to stop payment. There was still £800,000 worth of its
paper in circulation, and the distress the failure occasioned
in Scotland could only be compared with the disaster caused
by the Darien scheme?
There was another outburst of commercial prosperity on ioe dogo
the cessation of the American War in 1782. The sudden disaster in
opening up of markets encouraged reckless speculation, and 1
it is said that the Directors of the Bank were incautious in
their issues and thus fostered the evil?; but they had wisdom
bo retrace their steps in time. Their gold reserve was re-
duced to a very low ebb, but they thought it was possible, by
carefully restricting their issues, to tide over the time till
specie should arrive, in payment of goods already sent to
foreign markets. The point of safety would be marked by
a turn in the exchanges, and they refused to make a loan
even to Government, in May 1783. It was not till the
following October that the favourable signs appeared, and
that they felt justified, with regard to their own safety, in
extending their issues, by lending to the Government.
Ten years later, with continued peace, there had been but the
a great expansion of trading and there were premonitory of rade in
symptoms of disaster. The period might perhaps have been Tio
iided over but for the outbreak of the Revolutionary
War®, Almost immediately afterwards a great firm of corn
. Macleod, op. eit. 1. 504. 2 Ib. mm. 215, 8 Id. 1. 507.
\ Tb. 1. 508. 5 See below, p. 674.
29.9