The Armed Forces of Soviet Russia.
By General A. Winogradsky.
CONTENTS: The Imperial Army; General formation of the Soviet Army; Social
and Political Standing of the Soviet Army; Its Racial Composition; Organisation;
Commanding Officers; Military Schools; * The Food Supply; Military Industries;
Conclusion.
[Mee Imperial Army — which had at times been heavily defeated, but
had nevertheless known the greatest victories in having conquered
Charles XII, Frederick and Napoleon — ceased to exist in the Spring of 1917.
It is true that the Manchurian campaign, and some of the periods of
the Great War proved a failure for us, the reason, however, must be sought
in those extraordinary conditions in which the troops had been placed. In
Manchuria the army fought at a distance of ten thousand versts from its
base, connected only with it by the insufficient tie of the Siberian railway,
while the Russian country remained almost entirely indifferent to the war.
During the sad year 1915 the army lacked munition, and throughout the
whole war it was inferior to the enemy in the matter of technical equipment
and means, and as it soon became evident found insufficient moral and
material support in its rear. Owing to a number of factors, which it would
not do to dwell on here in detail, Russia, as a whole proved unable of
developing as full a “potency” of war (to use a current expression) as did
her enemies and her Allies.
Now let us try to furnish a short characteristic sketch of the old valiant
Imperial Army. It was formed on the principle of universal military service,
which, however, did not extend to the whole population as an abnormal
number of privileges were conceded for family and economic reasons; and
moreover, some of the non-Russians were exempt from compulsory military
service. Nevertheless, the army of 1500000 men represented a solid con-
tingent, partly weakened, however, by the addition of reserves and by the
formation of “second turn’ infantry divisions when a general mobilisation
became necessary.
Thanks to a comparatively long service term, and to the experience which
had been acquired in two centuries in training and education, the latter
qualification being pervaded by psychological ideas (the bequest of a long
succession of generals beginning with Peter the Great and Suvoroff) —
thanks to all these circumstances, our permanent army was of a high
standard of efficiency. Its backbone, the officers corps, was eager to give
its life for Tzar and country, and was bound by those invisible, spiritual
ties to the rank and file, which alone can weld a detachment into a cohesive
unit. If, in the old Russian army there were defects of a purely military
nature, they were redeemed by enormous merits. To sum up; as regards
HOR