and 85 0p respectively, and dropping among commanders of companies 
and platoons (non-commissioned officers) to 36 and 27 %. 
Until 1925 the principle of Sole-Command was not observed, and out 
of political considerations two powers were in command — the military 
commander and a political commissary, who had the same rights, formed 
decisions together and carried them out, the second often acting as political 
controller of the first, and having more influence than he. At the present 
time it has been possible to abolish this state of affairs, and to concentrate 
all the military and economic functions in the hands of the commander, 
and to “release’’ the commissaries of this control. They have been left the 
duty of signing together with the commanders certain categories of docu- 
ments (for instance, political, mobilisation and operative orders), but they 
have lost the right of arresting the fulfilment of the commanders’ orders, 
and can only raise complaints against them. The full functions of the 
commissary have been preserved in the navy and the national army-for- 
mations only, Experiments have also been made for vesting the duties of 
the commissaries in the commanders, but the military men proved insuffi- 
ciently prepared in a political sense. Measures have now been undertaken 
for filling up this insufficiency, and it has been resolved to introduce the 
principle of Sole-Command a} all costs. 
The introduction of the principle of Sole-Command increases the 
military value of the army; but it was unwillingly accepted by many of the 
commanders, some of them having lost, and others having never acquired 
the habit of manifesting a will of their own or personal initiative and 
responsibility. At any rate, the new order of things has up to now not 
decreased the weight of the military political apparatus which is necessary 
to the Soviet Government for propaganda work, control and a tight grip 
on the army, but it has only changed the relations between the commanders 
and the commissaries wherever the latter still exist. Among others the 
military prosecutors, in consequence of the distorted application of the 
principle of controlling the loyalty of the commanders’ actions, and 
because of the universally established system of espial and denunciation, 
very often check the work of the commanders by unnecessarily interfering 
with their activity beforehand. 
An age-limit has been established for the Commanders much lower 
than that ruling in other armies. This regulation, though unsatisfactory 
under the complicated social conditions of a modern war, is partly 
explained by the political apprehension of the Government, lest a wise 
and capable chief should acquire too great an influence were he suffered 
bo occupy his high position too long. 
The technical training of the staff of commanders is extremely un- 
satisfactory, especially in the reserves. The reasons for this fact are the 
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