enclosed holdings exempted from general intermixture of fields and 
compulsory rotation of crops (such holdings were called “khootor’s vest 
“otroob”s). In so far as the Bolshevist revolution raised its hand against 
these progressive peasant farms and holdings, destroying them and scattering 
to the winds their capital, it undermined the very bases of the agricultural 
evolution of the country. For here the question was not of seizing and 
partitioning land, nor even of seizing and partitioning agricultural capital, 
but of changing both the legal foundations and the main technical con- 
ditions of the agricultural production of the peasant mass itself. 
We see, thus, that the immediate effect of the Bolshevist agrarian 
revolution on the agriculture of Russia was twofold. On the one hand, 
it simply meant a redistribution of land and a destruction of the agricultural 
capital, on the other hand it involved regressive changes in the very structure 
of agricultural production, putting, in the place of free and rounded land- 
holdings, others, technically parcellated and dependent on the community. 
But perhaps still more profound and pernicious than the immediate 
and destructive effect of the Bolshevist revolution on the agriculture of 
Russia, was its indirect effect through the medium of general economic 
relations. 
The agrarian revolution represented but one aspect of the Bolshevist 
revolution; its other aspect was the socialisation or nationalisation of 
industry. In any country industry and agriculture form a eystem of inter- 
dependent markets: industry is a market for agriculture and vice versa. 
This is the more true of Russia with her large territory and her economic 
self-sufficiency. Even for the agriculture of Russia, not speaking of the 
industry, outside markets always played a subsidiary role. ' 
The socialisation or nationalisation of industry in Russia has brought 
about a curtailment of industrial production, making it more costly and 
worse in quality*). Thereby it has curtailed the home market for agri- 
cultural production, and since all production both for its economic pro- 
sperity and for its technical development needs primarily a stable and 
growing market, the socialisation (= nationalisation, or perhaps it would 
be best to call it “etatisation”) of industry has dealt the most terrible blow 
to Russian agriculture. To this was added, of course, the “etatisation” of 
trade and the general attempt at a thorough regulation of the economic 
life in its entirety. 
*) Even the most biassed Bolshevist authors have to admit in their economic 
surveys on the occasion of the roth anniversary of the October revolution that the 
prices of industrial commodities constitute the weakest spot of the Soviet economics. 
Whereas for the agricultural commodities the ratio of actual prices to the pre-war 
standard is 160: 100, in the industry it is 250: 100. 
g 7.