industry and trade. During this time the Government itself also begins
to recognise the threatening depreciation of the capital stock of the in-
dustry. The installations of factories and works which, moreover, in tech-
nical respects were in a very bad state, lose nearly 60 % of their productive
capability during the time of the revolution. In addition to this, agri-
culture — being compelled to support the Communist State, the State
industry and the transport system of the State, — begins to feel the im-
possibility of reconstructing the exhausted powers of production.
The Currency has passed through a special development. Under point 15
of the economic programme of the Communist party, it is stated:...
“As long as the communistic production and distribution of the products
is not completely organised, the abolition of money appears impossible.
The Russian communist party relies on the nationalisation of the banks and
endeavours to carry out a number of measures which are to extend the
range of settling accounts without ready money, and to prepare for the
abolition of money...” According to the programme, it was resolved to let
the rouble die a natural death, but at the same time paper-money was being
issued in perfectly unlimited quantities. A condition of affairs appeared,
which a leading co-worker of communism characterised by the expression:
“division of the issuing cauldron” (= distribution of food from the soup-
kitchen). At the same time a project for a substitute for money by means
of “working-tickets” was worked out, by which the hours devoted to “work
of general utility” could be fixed. At the beginning of the new economic
policy in 1921, the enormous quantity of paper-money circulating in the
country expressed in genuine roubles representing the equivalent in goods,
amounted to 44 millions of roubles. This state of affairs was described
as a catastrophe, even among the ranks of the communists themselves, which
actually injured the still remaining possibilities of production at its very
roots. The rouble was actually in a dying state, and it was not possible to
replace it by “working-tickets” or by “settlement of accounts without cash”,
but only by the system of currency which existed before the revolution.
The monetary reform proved to be the most difficult, and as the least
stable of all reforms following on the new economic policy. At the be-
ginning an attempt was made to create a doubtful circulation of money:
at the commencement of 1923, the relatively secured “Cherwonez’’ was
created for the industry, especially for the settlements between the various
trusts, as well as for meeting the necessities of the party; but for the
country, the persistently falling “Sowsnak” (Soviet paper-money) was left.
However, this state of affairs could not last for long. At the beginning
of 1924, L. Kamenev has proclaimed the unavoidable necessity of passing
on to a stabilised monetary value: “We cannot support ourselves any
longer by the Soviet paper-money, no. not for a month. — not even for
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