XXII INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION 
The tax imposed by the act of June 13, 1898 (war-revenue act), on sugar 
refining companies was not a direct tax but a “ special excise tax.” (Spreckles 
Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U. 8., 8397; T. D. 760.) 
The uniformity clause of the Constitution relates only to geographical uni- 
formity. (Head Money Cases, 112 U. S., 580.) . 
The corporation excise tax provision of the act of August 5, 1909, is consti- 
tutional. The tax is not a direct. tax, but an impost or excise which Congress 
has power to impose. (Flint ov. Stone-Tracy Co., 220 U. S., 107; -T. D. 1685.) 
The income tax act of October 3, 1913, declared constitutional; it does not 
violate the rules of apportionment and uniformity. (Brushaber v. Union Pacific 
R. R. Co, 240 U. S,, 1; T. D. 2290.) 
+ Constitutional amendment 16 did not extend the taxing power to new subjects. 
but merely removed the necessity which otherwise might exist for an apportion- 
ment among the States of taxes laid on income. (Eisner ». Macomber, 252 
U. S., 189; T. D. 3010.) 
Constitutional amendment 16 should not be extended by loose construction, 
so as to repeal or modify, except as applied to income, those provisions of the 
Constitution that require an apportionment according to population for direct 
taxes upon property, real and personal. (Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. 8., 189; 
T. D. 3010.) 
Jince constitutional amendment 5 does not require equal protection of the 
laws, as does amendment 14, applying to State action, cases decided under 
amendment 14 have no application to Federal taxes, where the only uniformity 
prescribed is the territorial uniformity required by Article I, section 8. (La 
Belle Iron Works ». United States, 256 U. S., 377; T. D. 3181.) 
POWERS AS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND A STATE 
No State court can by injunction or otherwise prevent Federal officers from 
collecting Federal taxes. The Government of the United States within its 
sphere is independent of State action. (Keely ». Sanders, 99 U. S., 443.) 
The "same principle which denies to a State power to raise a revenue by tax- 
ation on Federal property, or sources of revenue, or means of carrying on its 
Juties, forbids taxation of State revenue for Federal purposes. (12 Op. Atty. 
Gen., 282; Collector v. Day, 11 Wall,, 113; Ambrosini ». United States. 187 U. Ss, 
L; T. D. 593.) 
As the States can not tax the powers, the operations, or the property of the 
United States, nor the means which they employ to carry their powers into 
oxecution, so it has been held the United States have no power under the 
~“onstitution to tax either the instrumentalities or the property of a State. 
(Pollock v. Trust Co., 157 U. S., 584.) 
A municipal corporation is a portion of the sovereign power of the State, 
and is not subject to taxation by Congress upon its municipal revenues. 
(United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall,, 322.) } 
The exemption of State agencies does not extend to those used by the State 
n carrying on an ordinary private business. (South Carolina v. United States, 
(99 U. S., 437; T. D. 961.) 
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 
Intention: In construing statutes the fundamental rule is to get at the in- 
-ention of the legislature. (In re Matthews, 109 Fed., 603.) 
Tegislative intention is the guide to true judicial interpretation. (United 
States v. 100 Barrels of Spirits, 12 Int. Rev. Reg., 153.) 
A well-settled rule of interpretation is that a legislative act is to be inter- 
preted according to the intention of the legislature apparent upon its face. 
‘Wilkinson v. Deland, 2 Pet., 627; 22 Op. Atty. Gen., 363.) 
The intention must be found from the language used. (Merritt v. Welsh, 104 
J. 8., 694.) 
It is the duty of the court to study the whole statute, its policy, its spirit, its 
purpose, its language, and, giving to the words used their obvious and natural 
import, to read the act with these aids in such way as will best effectuate the 
intention of the legislature. (United States ». 100 Barrels of Spirits. 12 Int. 
Rev. Rec., 154.) 
Liberal or strict construction.— Revenue laws are not, like penal acts, to be 
construed strictly in favor of the defendants. They are rather to be regarded