356 OPIUM, ETC., AND COMPOUNDS, MANUFACTURERS 
‘ake a principal part in a prohibited sale of morphine be- 
longing to another by issuing a prescription for it, in view 
of Criminal Code, section 332, making whoever aids, abets, 
counsels, commands, induces or procures the commission 
of an offense a principal. (Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 
254 U. S., 189; T. D. 3127.) , 
Subdivision (a) of section 2 of the antinarcotie act, in 
allowing the dispensing or distribution of narcotic drugs 
“to a patient’ by a registered physician “in the course 
of his professional practice only,” confines the immunity 
strictly within the appropriate bounds of a physician's 
professional practice, not permitting sales to dealers or 
distributions intended to satisfy the appetites or cravings 
of persons addicted to the use of such drugs. (Id.) 
A prescription which enables a person, known to the physi- 
cian to be an addict, to obtain a quantity of narcotics suffi- 
cient for an enormous number of ordinary doses, without 
restraint upon him in the administration or disposition 
thereof, is not a prescription in the course of professional 
practice within the meaning of section 2 (a), Harrison 
Narcotic Act (38 Stat, 785), notwithstanding that a pre- 
scription for a single dose or even a number of doses may 
not bring a physician within the penalties of the act and 
that he may, in his judgment, vary the dose to suit the case. 
(United States v. Behrman, 258 U. 8., 280; T. D. 3376.) 
Where an indictment charged in substance that the de- 
fendant, a duly licensed physician registered under the act, 
nnlawfully sold, bartered, and gave certain derivatives of 
opium and coca leaves, not in pursuance of any written 
order on a form issued by the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, but by issuing three orders in the form of pre- 
scriptions, calling for delivery of large quantities of the 
drugs, to a person known to the physician to be an addict, 
who did not by reason of any other disease than addiction 
require their administration, upon which orders the drugs 
were obtained, the acts charged constitute an offense within 
‘he meaning of the act of December 17, 1914, as amended. 
1d.) 
An exception in a statute defining an offense is met in an 
indictment by alleging facts sufficient to show that the de- 
fendant was not within the exception. (Id.) 
An indictment for a statutory offense need not charge 
scienter or intent if the statute does not make them ele- 
ments. (1d.) 
It is sufficient that the indictment charge that the de- 
fendant issued prescriptions for quantities sufficient to 
make a great number of doses, moré than enough to satisfy 
the cravings of an addict, if all consumed at one time, in- 
tending that he shall use them by self-administration in 
divided doses over a period of several days, thus enabling 
the addict to obtain such excessive quantities without other 
order from a pharmacist and to have them in his possession 
and control with no other restraint upon their administra- 
tion or disposition than his owned weakened will. (Id.) 
Where a physician, acting bona fide and according to fair 
medical standards, gives an addict moderate amounts of 
narcotics for self-administration. in order to relieve condi- 
tions incident to addiction, section 2 of the Harrison Anti- 
narcotic Law is inapplicable. What constitutes bona fide 
medical practice, consistent with the statute, depends upon 
the facts and circumstances in the case. (Linder v. United 
States, 268 U. 8, 5.) 
Direct control of medical practice in the States is ob- 
viously beyond the power of Congress. Incidental regula- 
tion of such practice by Congress through a taxing act, like 
the Harrison Antinarcotic Law. can not extend to matters