12
EUROPE AND AFRICA
tant factors in this transformation was the influence of the
people upon the British foreign policy. The franchise, which
had been placed on a sound basis by the reforms of 1832,
was enlarged by the laws of 1867 and 1884; and thereafter
the effect of public opinion upon the conduct of British for-
eign affairs was distinctly noticeable. Disraeli, one of the
first modern statesmen to undertake an aggressive foreign
policy, was put out of office in 1880 because his acts failed
to meet with popular favor; and the Gladstone ministry
which succeeded him fell five years later, on account of the
public disapproval of its vacillating conduct of foreign affairs.
But it is safe to say that, when the British Government
took a prominent and dignified part in the forward move-
ment for territory during the last fifteen years of the nine-
teenth century, it had the support of the people behind it.
The same lethargy and indecision prevailed in the direc-
tion of French foreign policy. No one took much interest
in colonial affairs. To the majority of French statesmen,
colonies were as useless and unjustifiable an expense as
“poids mort 4 trainer” and “une loge 4 1’Opéra.” Officials
appointed to the colonial service considered themselves
exiled; and public men generally considered colonial posses-
sions as places fit only for the training of soldiers and sailors,
for the harboring of criminals, and for the dissipation of the
wealth and blood of the French nation. There was little
or no public discussion of the question; and the masses
were totally ignorant of, and indifferent to, the success or
failure of the national colonial policy. Between 1815 and
1870 France more than doubled her territorial possessions
outside of Europe, securing a firm foothold in Indo-China,
Algeria, and Senegal; but this was not the result of any
preconceived or aggressive forward policy. These annex-
ations were largely accidental — the result of the sudden
desire of a few prominent officials to gain glory or popular-
