WORK IN THE ARMY
as the buildings themselves without having to depend upon the regular
 service of the railways. Many depots had as much as 85 per cent
of their supplies delivered by horse or motor car.
The depots soon set up an independent machinery for purchases.
The various institutions at the front having no experience at the
outset, did not even attempt to plan their work in advance. Their
demands on the depots showed as complete a lack of foresight and
system as the military operations themselves. It was impossible to
wait until Moscow should be able to execute urgent orders, so that
the depots at the front were compelled to buy up hastily supplies of
the commodities of which they had no stock. The depots nearest to
the trenches found themselves frequently in the same situation, as
regards their dealings with the other depots, on which they depended
 as their base at the front. Lastly, whenever the institutions
of the Union were unable to obtain promptly from the nearest depots
 the articles they required, they endeavored to make independent
 purchases. The uncodrdinated activities of the purchasing
agents of the numerous institutions of the Union, even though tending
 to increase prices, enabled them to make better use of the local
markets.
Very soon, however, and especially after the great retreat of the
Russian armies in the summer of 1915, local markets were exhausted.
 This buying on their own account, coupled with much selfconfidence
 and the maintenance of independent connections between
the officers of the Zemstvo Union and different regions of Russia,
led the zemstvos to send a number of special purchasing agents to
the interior of the country. In consequence there was chaos in the
organization of supply, and a most deplorable competition in the
interior.
The Central Committee of the Union, anxious though it was to
respect the independence of its local organs, found it necessary to
intervene at this juncture. It insisted upon the submission of detailed
 and specified estimates by the institutions at the front; as the
latter had by this time acquired a considerable amount of experience,
 it was possible at the beginning of 1916 to establish a budgetary
 system in place of the chaotic management that had hitherto
prevailed. A number of conferences were held in Moscow, in which
representatives from the front participated and where the requirements
 of the institutions at the front were definitely ascertained. We