240 The Stock Market Crash—And After 
lowered its discount rate to five per cent and a little 
later to 414 per cent. 
Thus “tight-money” conditions were obviated, and 
a billion dollars of extra credit was provided, prov- 
ing the strength and resourcefulness of the Federal 
Reserve System. 
Inquiry Concerning “Bear Raids” 
Another measure of undoubted efficacy was the 
New York Stock Exchange inquiry concerning evi- 
dence of “bear raids.” The exchange on November 
13th called on members to report in detail about 
stocks they had lent or borrowed on which there had 
been a failure to deliver, with the exception of odd 
lots. No explanation accompanied this action. Un- 
doubtedly its purpose was to identify such “big bear 
operators” as were, possibly, responsible for the 
repeated attacks on the market. The very nature of 
such an inquiry was deterrent in discouraging or- 
ganized short-selling of the character that would fur- 
ther unbalance a panic-stricken market. The inquiry 
was slightly retroactive, requiring information as of 
the close of business November 12, 1929; it required 
subsequent daily reports of changes involving failure 
to deliver listed stocks that had been loaned or bor- 
rowed up to November 25th, when the daily ques- 
tionnaire was abandoned. The decision to call for 
this information was made at a time when stocks 
were at their lowest point and seemed to be at the 
mercy of bear raiders. Members of the voluntary 
banking group that had met for several days in the