28 UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Supreme Court of 
Missouri, holding the Act to be valid and constitutional, stating the 
answer to the claim that the law was ex post facto to be that the 
law is not retroactive but only becomes effective within three months 
after its passage. As to the constitutional question, the Supreme 
Court held that the State had the right under its police power to 
enact such legislation. 
The question before the court in that case is totally different from 
any of the questions presented in the proposed legislation and cer- 
tainly is not an authority to support the unconstitutionality of the 
pending bill. 
Not a single case cited in the brief supports its contention, several 
of the cases, as above pointed out, and especially the Frothingham 
case, infra, show that the proposed legislation is constitutional. 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts ». Mellon and Frothingham ov. 
Mellon (262 U. S. 447), is also cited in the brief to support the con- 
tention that the proposed act is unconstitutional. The Supreme 
Court in this case had under consideration the maternity act (42 
Stat. 224). The provisions of the maternity act, in so far as con- 
cerns the appropriation of money by Congress to be allocated to the 
States upon the acceptance of the benefits and compliance with the 
requirements by the States, are analagous with the provisions of the 
pending bill. It was contended, in that case, that the act was un- 
constitutional. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal because of 
lack of jurisdiction and not upon the merits of the case. There are 
certain statements of the court which clearly indicate that the court, 
however, was of the opinion that the act was constitutional and which 
also clearly answer some of the contentions made in the brief of the 
association as to the proposed legislation. The court stated, page 480: 
Probably it would be sufficient to point out, that the powers of the State are 
not invaded, since the statute imposes no obligation, but simply extends an 
option which the State is free to accept or reject. 
That is the very kernel of the principle proposed in Senate bill 3060. 
At page 482, the court further stated: 
What, then, is the nature of the right of the State here asserted, and how is it 
affected by this statute? Reduced to its simplest terms, it is alleged that the 
statute constitutes an attempt to legislate outside the powers granted to Congress 
by the Constitution and within the field of local powers exclusively reserved to 
the States. Nothing is added to the force or effect of this assertion by the further 
incidental allegations that the ulterior purpose of Congress thereby was to induce 
the States to yield a portion of their sovereign rights that the burden of the. 
appropriations falls unequally upon the several States; and that there is imposed 
upon the States an illegal and unconstitutional option either to yield to the 
Federal Government a part of their reserved rights or lose their share of the moneys 
appropriated. But what burden is imposed upon the States, unequally or other- 
wise? Certainly there is none, unless it be the burden of taxation and that falls 
upon their inhabitants, who are within the taxing power of Congress as well as 
that of the States where they reside. Nor does the statute require the States 
to do or to yield anything. If Congress enacted it with the ulterior purpose of 
tempting them to yield that purpose may be effectively frustrated by the simple 
expedient of not vielding. 
It seems that if the country were passing upon Senate bill 3060 it 
could not better express it; the language thus used with reference to 
the maternity statute would apply with equal force to Senate bill 
2060. 
In the last analysis, the complaint of the plaintiff State is brought to the naked 
contention that Congress has usurped the reserved powers of the several States