TY 
ACTS OF STATE ORGANS 
(a) In the enforcement of responsibility, the following features have to 
be considered: first, its general characteristics; secondly, its various forms; 
*hirdly, its application; and fourthly, its judicial sanction. The general 
characteristics of responsibility refer especially to the acts of State organs 
which are to be deemed wrongful per se or because of a misfeasance. The 
forms of responsibility would cover both the direct obligation of the State 
in respect of the acts of its own organs and its indirect responsibility aris- 
ing from the act of another State with which it maintains a special relation- 
ship. The application would involve the responsibility of the various State 
organs, regardless of their functions as defined by its municipal law, 
and even though their acts may have been performed in accordance 
with the municipal law and in pursuance of the powers thereby granted, 
or otherwise. The State may also become responsible on account of the 
attitude it may assume in respect of undue injury inflicted upon aliens by 
private citizens. The judicial sanction covering State responsibility would, 
of course, provide also the proper remedy. 
(b) The wrongful nature of the act in respect of which responsibility is 
sought to be established is, naturally, a condition precedent thereof. The 
common law requires that the agent to whom the consequences of the alleged 
wrongful act are imputed should possess certain qualifications. Likewise, 
in the Law of Nations it is necessary to establish, in accordance with the 
law, special qualifications in reference to the agent charged with the alleged 
njury, as well as the basis of distinction between the acts of the individual 
n his private and in his official capacity as an officer of the State.l Not all 
“On what grounds will certain individual acts be imputed, not to the individual 
who executed them, but through him, to another entity, in fact, an artificial entity in 
some way supposed to be behind him, namely: the State? We can, of course, perceive 
through our senses only physical acts of individuals; however, the nature of the ‘State 
act’ does not possess the perceptible properties characteristic of certain acts. This 
conception of the State as the ‘power behind’ or the constructive ‘perpetrator’ of these 
acts, can only be attained by a process of reasoning which we will term ‘imputation’. 
However, there is only one notion which permits such individual acts to be considerad 
as acts of the State and attributable to the latter : their conforming to certain valid