RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES 
breach and should be held responsible for the resulting injury. The very 
same consequences should follow the cases in which the authority is ex- 
ceeded, or the usual rules disregarded. If the personality of the State 
embodies that of its organs, whose action renders its being manifest and 
concrete, for otherwise it would be a non-entity, it has to be recognized that 
the limitation consists merely in the fact that the official may not have acted in 
his capacity as such. If the agent who exceeds his authority has, in fact, 
acted in his official capacity, using the means placed at his disposal by the 
State, the responsibility of the latter has in such case been grounded for 
oractical purposes upon the necessity to afford security to international 
-elations. It is considered necessary and just, because the State should bear 
the risks incident to its activities. 
This question gave rise to a very interesting debate at the Lausanne 
session of the Institute of International Law. Mr. Strisower, the reporter 
of the Institute, offered a formula which recognizes the responsibility of 
the State in connection with the illicit acts of its organs, when the acts are 
performed under color of official authority. He excepted, however, the 
case in which the alleged act should be so clearly beyond the authority of 
its perpetrator that no mistaken impression could have been reasonably 
conveyed. Mr. de Lapradelle and Mr. Politis raised objections to the latter 
exception. Mr. De Visscher supported it, stating a doctrine similar to the one 
of State risks. He believes that from the very moment that official con- 
nection is established between the State and the delinquent organ the State 
becomes prima facie responsible. However, the State may overcome this 
presumption by showing that in the performance of the alleged act the 
agent has not made use of the powers vested upon him; because it is his 
ase of his official character, or of the means at his command by virtue of 
such character, which involve the responsibility of the State. 
Mr. de Lapradelle then proposed the following amended formula: “The 
State is responsible for the acts of its organs even when they have exceeded 
their authority, provided they have performed the same under color of 
authority as official organs of the State, and making use of the means placed 
at their disposal.” 
(c) The other condition precedent to responsibility in reference to the 
manner in which the acts of the agents of the State have been performed, 
involves the question of culpability. The main difficulties of this question 
arise from the attempt to apply to the State the psychological doctrine of 
culpability derived from the Law of Rome, which, as it is well known, 
referred to the conduct of persons and not of legal entities. Naturally, 
his attempt to apply to the body politic the same rules laid down in 
respect of the acts of individuals, has given rise to a series of more or less 
rreconcilable objections. The eminent professors Triepel and Anzilotti