PROTECTION OF ALIENS

45

Some of the authorities differ as regards this latter view. It is pointed
out that the international common law is not like the positive law established
by treaties and accepted usage. Therefore, beyond these two sources, no
definite standards could be established covering the duties incumbent upon
the States. It might be well also to remember the indefinite line between
national and international rights. At the present time, the States construe
and apply these rights in many different ways. This is clearly shown by
their action in connection with monopolies, government control of business,
immigration, deportation of aliens, tariffs, and emergency laws regarding
price fixing and other forms of restriction imposed upon commercial freedom.
 This means that the juridical status of these matters, which are considered
 to be of national incumbency, does not permit the establishment of
international standards. It is doubted, therefore, whether international rules
should be enforced in preference to the municipal law as regards the protection
 of aliens.
These comments refer to certain specific measures which are undergoing
a stage of evolution in modern jurisprudence, and none of which are inconsistent
 with the principles of natural justice that prevent the State sovereignty
 from ruling without limitations of any sort, or making its will preponderant
 in every sense, without giving due consideration to the fundamental
 necessities of government generally accepted by the civilized world.
There is a minimum juridical standard imposed by human civilization, without
 which neither the existence of the State as a sovereign entity nor that of
the international community could be conceived. Even those various measures
 to which we have referred are not altogether at variance in principle.
Underlying these measures there are certain leading precepts that no State
could afford to ignore without drawing protests from the others. One of
these principles might be, for instance, the one of due compensation for the
confiscation of property for public use.
This debate, however, has no longer any theoretical importance or practical
 significance. A scientific fact of paramount importance has been elicited,
which has altogether altered the situation. It is now conceived that the rights
of man are not a matter exclusively dependent upon the will of the State.
It has been mentioned elsewhere that at its New York session the Institute
of International Law has invested the rights of man with international
character. This means, in other words, that the rights of man are thereby
placed under the patronage of the international community. “The juridical
mind of the civilized world”—states the pronouncement of the Institute—
“demands the recognition of the rights of man free from all attempts on
the part of the State.” The leading exponent of this doctrine, President
Tames Brown Scott. thus comments upon it: