NOMINAL VALUE,

13

and which is asserted by its author tobe “true
in such a way and degree, as to oblige him who
denies it to maintain an absurdity,” is either a
palpable contradiction in terms, or a mere truism
scarcely worth a word of illustration, much less
that display of logical dexterity which he has
exhibited in its support. Since value must be
value in something, or in relation to something,
if there is any meaning at all in the proposition,
“ that itis possible for a continually to increase
in value, and yet command a continually decreasing
 quantity of B,” it must be either, (1)
that a may increase in value in relation to B,
and yet command a continually decreasing
quantity of this very B; or (2) that A may
continually increase in value in relation to
other commodities, or what amounts to the same
thing, to a third commodity c, while the said a
commands a continually decreasing quantity of
B. These are the only possible interpretations
which can be given of the proposition, according
 to the received definition of value. Now in
the first sense, the proposition is palpably absurd,