NOMINAL VALUE, 
13 
and which is asserted by its author tobe “true 
in such a way and degree, as to oblige him who 
denies it to maintain an absurdity,” is either a 
palpable contradiction in terms, or a mere truism 
scarcely worth a word of illustration, much less 
that display of logical dexterity which he has 
exhibited in its support. Since value must be 
value in something, or in relation to something, 
if there is any meaning at all in the proposition, 
“ that itis possible for a continually to increase 
in value, and yet command a continually de- 
creasing quantity of B,” it must be either, (1) 
that a may increase in value in relation to B, 
and yet command a continually decreasing 
quantity of this very B; or (2) that A may 
continually increase in value in relation to 
other commodities, or what amounts to the same 
thing, to a third commodity c, while the said a 
commands a continually decreasing quantity of 
B. These are the only possible interpretations 
which can be given of the proposition, accord- 
ing to the received definition of value. Now in 
the first sense, the proposition is palpably absurd,