I16 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
approaching to definiteness, if not fixity, is inherent in
the human mind, witness the declaration of poor, bewildered
Louis XVI not long before the French Revolution.
Conscious that le régime du bon plaisir (i.e. of the King’s
will) was doomed, he declared that France desired une
maniére fixe d'étve gouvernée. That admission heralded the
dawn of a democratic order on the Continent. Thenceforth
the typical State was not to be the expression of one
man’s will, but of ““ the general will,” which Rousseau
affirmed to be the source of all law and administration.
But even when we limit ourselves to the modern State
based on representative institutions, we find a great
variety of conceptions regarding its functions. The
most important of these differences arise respecting the
claims which the State may make on the liberty and
services of the individual citizen. Here at once we plunge
into the region of controversies that are certain to become
more and more acute. In this connection it is well to remember
that the democratic States of the Ancient World,
e.g. that of Athens, required implicit and almost unlimited
obedience from their citizens. These were bound
in many ways which we should deem abhorrent to true
liberty. Transport a Londoner to the Sparta of Lycurgus,
and he would protest vigorously that he was a mere bondman,
not much better off than the actual slaves. Again,
the fact that a Roman citizen could for heinous crimes be
degraded to the position of a slave illustrates the radical
difference between the authority of the State over the
individual in the Ancient and Modern World. The power
of the Greek or Roman State was far greater than we
should allow; yet that power was accepted as in the
natural order of things by citizens who considered themselves
entirely free.
When, therefore, we approach the subject of the authority