[78 LECTURES ON NATIONALITY
discouraging, paralysing, and depressing effect on a clever,
enterprising, and highly developed nation such as the
Germans than a monotonous, dull policy, which, for fear
of an ensuing fight, avoids rousing passions by strong
action.” Bilow also advised the Government to fight
Social Democracy by ‘“ a great and comprehensive national
policy.” By this he declares that he meant the Germanizing
of all the races within the Empire, especially the Poles,
whose political incompetence had subjected them to the
superior organization of Prussia. But he deprecated the
conquest of neighbouring territories.
Such a limitation of Germany's expansive power displeased
German Chauvinists, who exercised greater pressure
on Biilow’s successor, Bethmann-Hollweg (1909). The
Foreign Assistant Secretary, Kiderlen-Waechter, favoured
the Agadir coup of July, 1911, which is known to have
been contrived by the Navy and other patriotic Leagues.
First, they pointed out in the Press the urgent need of
German expansion in Morocco ; and then the two Ministers
declared that they must try to keep pace with public
opinion. Thus the mutually exciting influences of the
Leagues and the Administration worked up a furious
national feeling which formed the chief danger of the
situation. The dispute at Agadir in itself was trivial, as
was afterwards admitted by German patriots. But their
masterful tone nearly brought about a general war.
Probably this was their aim; for great was their wrath
when the Kaiser and his Ministry finally patched up the
Morocco dispute by the compact of November 4, I0II,
with France, gaining about 100,000 square miles of French
Congoland at the price of their acquiescence in French
supremacy in Morocco. The rage of German Chauvinists
against the Kaiser for this profitable though inglorious
1 Jbid., pp. 157-204, 239-245.