L106 THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT [PART II
Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief of the island of
Jamaica and its dependencies, and was and still is as such
entitled to the privileges and exemptions appertaining to
such office and to the holder thereof, and that the acts
complained of in the said declaration were done by him as
Governor of the said Island of Jamaica, and in the exercise
of his reasonable discretion as such, and as acts of State ;
and this the defendant is ready to verify, wherefore he prays
judgment if he ought to be compelled to answer in this
action.’
The plaintiff demurred to this plea, and the present appeal
is from the judgment of the Supreme Court allowing the
demurrer, and ordering the appellant to answer further to
She writ and declaration.
The plea is in form a dilatory plea, and does not profess
to contain a defence in bar of the action. It was advisedly
pleaded as a plea of privilege, with the object of raising the
question of the immunity of the appellant as Governor from
being impleaded and compelled to answer in the courts of
the Colony. That this was so is plain not only from the form
of the plea, but from an arrangement come to between the
parties before the argument of the demurrer. In an inter-
locutory proceeding to set aside a judgment of non pros. as
irregularly obtained, an order was made by consent that
all pleas of the defendant, Sir Anthony Musgrave, except
the plea of privilege by attorney, be struck out, together
with replications and entry of judgment of non pros. with
liberty to the plaintiff to demur, it being arranged that the
demurrer be set down for hearing at the present term, and
if a judgment respondeat ouster the defendant, Sir Anthony
have liberty to plead not guilty by statutes.’
The decision of the Supreme Court was accordingly given
upon the plea, as a plea of privilege, and altogether upon
this aspect of it, the judgment being one of respondeat
ouster.
Upon the hearing of the present appeal the Attorney-
General, on the part of the appellant, whilst not giving up
the plea in the shape in which it was pleaded, insisted that
if it disclosed a good defence in substance to the action, as
he contended it did, its form and the arrangement of the
parties might be disregarded, and a general judgment given
for the defendant; and, though under protest from the
respondent’s counsel, the discussion at their Lordships’ bar
was allowed to take the wider scope which the Attorney-
General’s contention introduced into the case.