L114 THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT [PART II 
It was contended that, under ‘The Supreme Court 
Procedure Law, 1872,” of the Colony, which provides that 
defects in form shall be disregarded, and that, on demurrer, 
the court shall give judgment according to the very right 
of the cause, the judgment should now be given for the 
defendant ; but their Lordships think, for the reasons above 
given, that upon this ambiguous and defective plea a proper 
and final judgment on the right of the cause cannot be 
pronounced. 
In the result, their Lordships must humbly advise Her 
Majesty to affirm the judgment of the court below, and with 
costs. 
It is hard to see exactly how Mr. Tarring deduces this 
conclusion from the judgement in question. What the case 
decided would appear to be that the attempt by the Governor 
to set himself up as a Viceroy, i. e. as one against whom no 
action at all for his official conduct can be brought, failed. 
The Viceroy of Ireland is clearly in that position : that is 
to say, an action against him for any official act will be 
stayed by the court on application, without examining the 
colour of the act in question. The privilege is based clearly 
on the fact that the Lord-Lieutenant is really sn loco regis : he 
is no more answerable for his actions than the King himself, 
and presumably any action must be taken against some 
subordinate. The position of the Lord-Lieutenant was ap- 
parently not finally thought out by the Judicial Committee, 
but with regard to the case before them they show clearly 
that a Governor cannot expect to be exempt from jurisdiction 
unless he shows that he has acted in accordance with law. 
But it also seems clearly established by the words in that 
case, following the case of Cameron v. Kyte, that the Governor 
has not the full power of the Crown, and that even lawful acts 
done under the authority of the Governor may be illegal if 
he has not the requisite delegation of power. For example, 
it was not decided, or indeed clearly brought forward, in the 
case of Pulido whether the act might have been regarded as 
an act of State against a foreigner; in that event it would 
probably have been held that, had it been ratified by the 
Crown even ex post facto, it would have been valid, for that