264 THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT [PART II 
involved a grave responsibility ; and it has led, by natural 
consequence, to the Address which I have now to consider. 
The Secretary of State proceeded to announce the decision 
of the Imperial Government to terminate Sir C. Darling’s 
tenure of office, and directed him to leave the Colony in the 
>harge of the officer commanding. 
Governor Darling was therefore removed from office. But 
it was found necessary to remind later, in 1867, his successor 
also of the essential duty of observing the law : in a dis- 
patch of February 1, 1868,! the Secretary of State wrote :— 
But in any case in which the law invests you with the 
power of preventing the issue of public funds by refusing 
your warrant, or of preventing the conclusion of any contract, 
for the satisfaction of which no money has been provided 
by Parliament, Her Majesty’s Government are unable to 
relieve you of the necessity of deciding for yourself, according 
to the circumstances, whether you would be warranted in 
asing that power in order to prevent an issue of public 
funds which may appear to you unconstitutional. 
In the constitutional struggle, as renewed in 1878, the 
Governor had the misfortune to receive a rather severe 
rebuke from the Secretary of State for his action in allowing 
the Government to dismiss a large number of public servants. 
His action was not, it was clear, illegal, for it was upheld by 
the Courts except as to some minor matters, and the principle 
on which the censure of the Secretary of State was based 
was the necessity of maintaining the rule of the constitution 
that public servants who were not ministers were not liable 
bo dismissal on political grounds. In a dispatch of July 5, 
1878,2 the Secretary of State laid down the rule that the 
Governor was bound to secure respect for law, though he 
might normally act on the advice of his law officers if they 
advised as law officers not as ministers, but even if they 
advised he was not bound to accept their legal advice if 
he felt that it was wrong. He might break the law in case 
of necessity, but the necessity must be very strong and very 
clear : the responsibility was a grave one, and should only 
* Parl. Pap., H. C. 157, 1868, p. 50. # Ibid, C. 2173, p. 84.