790 THE FEDERATIONS AND THE UNION [PART IV 
Constitution, on the other hand, at once places all the old 
constitutions on a new basis by subordinating the executive 
head of the province to the control of the Governor-General 
and by subjecting the legislative power to disallowance by 
the Governor-General in Council. Moreover, the distribution 
of power is of an essentially different character in form at 
least ; the states have all their powers save so far as they 
are expressly taken away, and the provinces have only such 
powers as are expressly left to them. It is true that the 
difference is more in appearance, perhaps, than in reality, 
for the exclusive and paramount powers deprive the states 
of much of their old authority, but the difference is in 
principle essential, and marks the dependence of the 
Commonwealth Constitution on the American model, which 
was constantly before the minds of the delegates who 
framed the Constitution. 
In the constitution of the legislative power of the Common- 
wealth there is, in accordance with United States models, a 
deliberate attempt to secure some measure of state influence. 
The Senate is composed of six members from each state 
who are elected at present by the electors—not by the 
Legislature, as in the United States—each state as a single 
constituency. Half retire every three years (those to retire 
being decided originally by the receipt of the lowest number 
of votes in each state), the tenure of office being six years. 
The Parliament may make laws diminishing or increasing the 
number of senators, but the representation of each original 
state shall be equal, and there shall never be less than six 
senators for each state which was an original state. More- 
over, in the case of a casual vacancy in the representation 
of a state the election is to be made by the two Houses of 
the State Parliament sitting together, and not by the people, 
and the Governor in Council may appoint a senator to hold 
office until fourteen days after the Houses meet, if the 
vacancy occurs when they are not sitting. It was thought 
that in this way the smaller states would be able to secure 
power over finance and over arrangements likely to affect 
v Cf. Clark, Australian Constitutional Law, pp. 358-87.