vuAp. 1] THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 829
explanation he gave was that ‘they used language not
verbally identical, but synonymous, for the purpose of
defining that distribution’. It was, indeed, an expansion
of the canon of interpretation in question to consider the
knowledge of those who framed the Constitution, and their
supposed preferences for this or that model which might
have been in their minds. Their Lordships were not able to
acquiesce in any such principle of interpretation. The
Legislature must have had in their minds the constitution of
the several states with respect to which the Act of Parliament
which their Lordships were called upon to interpret was
passed. The 114th section of the Constitution Act suffi-
ciently showed that protection from interference on the part
of the federal power was not lost sight of. It was impossible
to suppose that the question now in debate was left to be
decided upon an implied prohibition when the power to enact
laws upon any subject whatsoever was before the Legisla-
ture. For these reasons their Lordships were not able to
acquiesce in the reasoning of the High Court judgements
governing the judgement under appeal. They would there-
fore humbly advise His Majesty that the judgement of the
Supreme Court of Victoria ought to be reversed, that it
ought to be declared that the salary in question was rightly
included in the state assessment and was liable to income-
tax, and that each party ought to pay his own costs of the
special case and in the Supreme Court.
When the matter came back to the High Court in the case
of Baxter v. Commissioners of Taxation, New South Wales}
the High Court had to decide whether it would follow the
judgement given by the Privy Council overruling its decision
in the preceding case. or whether it would re-assert: that
decision.
The High Court by a majority were of opinion that it was
proper that they should re-examine their previous judgement
in view of the fact that the Privy Council had disagreed with
it, but they were unable to accept the ruling of the Privy
Council. The majority (Griffith C.J., Barton and O’ConnordJJ.)
1 (1907) 4 C. L. R. 1087.
